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Effectively Regulating E- Cigarettes and Their 
Advertising—and the First Amendment
erIc n. LInDbLoM*
I. the cUrrent DebAte oVer e-cIGAretteS  
AnD the AbSence of conStrUctIVe reGULAtIon
There is a vigorous discussion in the public health community over how to regulate 
e-cigarettes and their marketing.1 Based on the fact that e-cigarette use directly mimics 
smoking but is less harmful to users and nonusers, some public health experts favor a 
soft approach. They do not want regulation to interfere with the potential of e-cigarettes 
to help smokers quit or to help smokers switch to a harm-reducing way to consume 
nicotine, and want to err on the side of being more permissive.2 Other public health 
experts favor a harder approach. They point to the fact that e-cigarette use is addictive 
and, at a minimum, still produces significant harms and risks compared to no tobacco 
or nicotine use at all. They also raise concerns that e-cigarette marketing can prompt 
some smokers to switch to e-cigarettes or to dual use instead of quitting all tobacco 
or nicotine use; increase relapse into nicotine addiction among former smokers; and 
increase youth and adult initiation into nicotine addiction, which could serve as a gateway 
into addicted smoking. They want a more strict approach, at least until more is known 
about e-cigarette harms and their impact on initiation, cessation and other use trends.3 
Some countries have already explicitly banned e-cigarettes altogether.4 Other 
countries allow the legal sale of e-cigarettes only if they first go through a formal 
* Former Director of the Office of Policy at FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products, currently on detail 
from the agency as a Senior Scholar at Georgetown University Law Center’s O’Neill Institute for National 
and Global Health Law. The viewpoints expressed in this article are Mr. Lindblom’s alone.
1 For the purpose of this paper and its proposals, the term “e-cigarettes” includes any product or device 
marketed or used to inhale nicotine into the lungs other than through combustion and smoking. See Lauren K. 
Lempert et al., The Importance of Product Definitions in U.S. E-cigarette Laws and Regulations, 24 TOBACCO 
CONTROL (forthcoming 2015), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/12/14/
tobaccocontrol-2014-051913 (advance copy published online ahead of print). For the purpose of this paper 
and its proposals, the term “e-cigarettes” includes any product or device marketed or used to inhale nicotine 
into the lungs other than through combustion and smoking. 
2 See, e.g., Peter Hajek et al., Electronic Cigarettes: Review of Use, Content, Safety, Effects on Smokers 
and Potential for Harm and Benefit, 109 addiCtion 1801, 1802 (2014); David B. Abrams, Promise and Peril 
of E-cigarettes: Can Disruptive Technology Make Cigarettes Obsolete?, 311 Jama 135, 136 (2014); see 
also Robert West & Jamie Brown, Editorials, Electronic Cigarettes: Fact and Faction, 64 brit. J. gen. praC. 
442, 442 (2014).
3 See, e.g., Editorial, E-cigarettes—Aid to Smoking Cessation or Smokescreen?, 384 lanCet 829, 
829 (2014); Dean E. Schraufnagel et al., Electronic Cigarettes: A Position Statement of International 
Respiratory Societies, 190 am. J. of respiratory & CritiCal Care med. 611, 611–16 (2014); World Health 
Org., Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Moscow, Russia, Oct. 13–18, 2014, Electronic Nicotine 
Delivery Systems, FCTC/COP/6/10 passim (July 21, 2014); Rachel Grana et al., E-cigarettes: A Scientific 
Review, 129 CirCulation 1972, 1972 (2014); Simon Chapman, Essay, E-cigarettes: The Best and Worst Case 
Scenarios for Public Health, 349 bmJ 5512 (2014).
4 Argentina and Singapore are examples. See, e.g., Inst. for Global Tobacco Control, Johns Hopkins 
Univ., u.s. state and Country laws regulating e-Cigarettes: a poliCy sCan 7 (Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 
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approval process and qualify as drugs or medical products that will safely and effectively 
promote a legitimate therapeutic purpose.5 While that process may appear prudent, 
drug approvals typically require considerable supporting evidence and take a substantial 
amount of time and trouble to obtain.  No e-cigarettes have yet qualified as drugs, and 
few have even submitted applications worldwide. Accordingly, countries that allow 
e-cigarettes on the market only as approved drugs or medical devices hinder and delay 
the potential for e-cigarettes to secure substantial public health gains, if not block it 
completely. 
In other countries, including the United States, e-cigarettes are readily available and 
largely unregulated.6 They are typically subject to only a patchwork of restrictions and 
requirements under pre-existing drug and consumer product laws and regulations.7 
On the plus side, this softer regulation permits smokers to obtain and use e-cigarettes 
as cessation aids or as a harm-reducing alternative way to consume nicotine. But the 
absence of regulation has also permitted the marketing of unnecessarily harmful and 
risky e-cigarettes. Moreover, the largely unconstrained advertising of e-cigarettes in the 
United States and elsewhere directly reaches youth and both non-smoking and smoking 
adults in ways that directly increase public health risks and harms.
A thoughtful, middle-ground approach to regulating e-cigarettes and their advertising 
could do much more to minimize e-cigarette health harms and risks while still allowing 
e-cigarettes to help smokers quit or serve as a viable harm-reducing alternative to 
smoking (without first going through a long and difficult drug-approval process). To 
date, however, no country has yet developed, much less implemented, a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme designed to do that in an effective way.8 
poliCy sCan].
5 Australia and Canada are examples. See, e.g., Hua-Hie Yong et al., Trends in E-cigarette Awareness, 
Trial, and Use Under the Different Regulatory Environments of Australia and the UK, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo 
res. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/11/28/ntr.ntu231 
(advance copy published online ahead of print); Notice: To All Persons Interested in Importing, Advertising 
or Selling Electronic Smoking Products in Canada, HealtH Can. (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/
dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applic-demande/pol/notice_avis_e-cig-eng.pdf.
6 As discussed more fully below, the United States offers a formal approval pathway for e-cigarettes 
to be marketed as drugs but leaves non-drug e-cigarettes almost totally unregulated. Because no e-cigarettes 
have even applied to become drugs in the United States, by prohibiting the sale of non-drug e-cigarettes FDA 
could establish an at least temporary de facto complete ban in the United States. The Tobacco Control Act 
prohibits FDA from banning all cigarettes, all smokeless tobacco products, all little cigars, all other cigars, 
all pipe tobacco, or all roll-your-own tobacco products; but it does not prohibit FDA from banning all or 
some e-cigarettes (once the agency begins regulating non-drug e-cigarettes as tobacco products). Tobacco 
Control Act § 907(d)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 387g(c)(3) (2012). In addition, Congress, individual states, or local 
jurisdictions could also take action to ban all or some e-cigarettes.
7 See, e.g., poliCy sCan, supra note 4. Some other countries, such as Togo and Costa Rica, specifically 
apply their existing tobacco control laws to e-cigarettes. This approach, which can include advertising bans, 
puts these countries somewhere between those with legal or de facto bans and those, such as the United 
States, that have not yet developed major new e-cigarette laws or rules. But treating e-cigarettes just like 
tobacco products fails to account for their differences, which can both impede their use as cessation aids or 
harm-reduction products and allow their marketing and sale to increase initiation and relapse into nicotine 
addiction and produce other preventable public health harms.
8 Two middle-ground approaches to regulating e-cigarettes that might provide the foundation for a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme to minimize harms and maximize benefits are in the United Kingdom, which 
has established special restrictions on e-cigarette advertising, and in the new European Union Directive on 
tobacco products, which includes a range of provisions relating to e-cigarettes. See, e.g., New U.K. Advertising 
Rules for E-cigarettes, Committees advertising praC. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://cap.org.uk/News-reports/Media-
Centre/2014/New-ecig-ad-rules.aspx#.VMfh1C4TfwB; Directive 2014/40/EU, of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 3 April 2014 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
of the Member States Concerning the Manufacture, Presentation and Sale of Tobacco and Related Products 
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In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken an important 
first step in that direction by issuing a proposed rule to establish its active authority to 
regulate all non-drug e-cigarettes as tobacco products.9 But the rule-making process 
has not included any significant new requirements or restrictions designed specifically 
for e-cigarettes or their advertising. For the most part, the rule making simply places 
e-cigarettes under the same requirements and restrictions that the statute applies to all 
“tobacco products.”10 That includes some constructive provisions, such as the Act’s ban 
on false or misleading tobacco product labeling or advertising and its requirement that no 
tobacco products be marketed or promoted with any reduced-risk or reduced-exposure 
claims without first obtaining a permissive order from FDA.11 But the rule making will 
not create the kind of regulatory framework necessary to minimize e-cigarette risks and 
harms or maximize their public health potential. 
One possible reason for the absence of any significant new regulation directed at 
e-cigarette advertising in the deeming rule could be a concern that the regulation would 
be challenged or struck down as unconstitutional. Since 1976, the First Amendment’s 
protections against government restrictions on speech have been applied to commercial 
speech (i.e., advertising and other communications to sell a product or service), making 
the regulation of tobacco product marketing more complicated.12 As discussed below, 
however, FDA could largely avoid First Amendment constraints through exercising its 
enforcement discretion and administering the procedures, established by the Tobacco 
Control Act, that require new tobacco products to obtain new product or substantial 
equivalence orders from FDA before they may be marketed legally in the United States.
II. we ALreADy know enoUGh AboUt e-cIGAretteS  
to reGULAte theM More effectIVeLy
Another common refrain is that developing an effective regulatory structure for 
e-cigarettes requires more information and research.13 Indeed, the debate in the public 
health community between those favoring softer versus harder approaches to regulating 
e-cigarettes has focused primarily on the lack of clear information about the actual 
effects of e-cigarette use and marketing on harms and use trends and, perhaps even 
more, on how to interpret the data and research that are available.14 In particular, there 
and Repealing Directive 2001/37/EC, 2014 O.J. (L127) (EU), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/
products/index_en.htm. 
9 Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 23,142 (proposed Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Deeming Rule] (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 
1140, 1143). As discussed below, FDA already has authority to regulate certain e-cigarettes (those that make 
therapeutic claims) as drugs. 
10 See id.
11 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 903, 911, 21 U.S.C. §§ 387c, 387k (2012).
12 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
13 See, e.g., Kevin M. Walton et al., NIH Electronic Cigarette Workshop: Developing a Research 
Agenda, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 259, 260 (2015); Natalie McGill, Research on E-cigarettes Examining 
Health Effects: Regulations Due, 43 nation’s HealtH 10 (2013) (quoting FDA spokesperson Jennifer Haliski, 
who stated: “Further research is needed to assess the potential public health benefits and risks of electronic 
cigarettes and other novel tobacco products.”); Daniella Saitta et al., Achieving Appropriate Regulations for 
Electronic Cigarettes, 5 tHerapeutiC advanCes in CHroniC disease 50, 50 (2014); Aruni Bhatnagar et al., 
Electronic Cigarettes: A Policy Statement from the American Heart Association, 130 CirCulation 1418, 1423 
(2014).
14 See, e.g., Grana et al., supra note 3; Ann McNeill et al., A Critique of a World Health Organization-
Commissioned Report and Associated Paper on Electronic Cigarettes, 109 addiCtion 1972, 1982 (2014); 
Stanton Glantz, Response to McNeill et al Criticism of the Report we Prepared for WHO and Subsequent 
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has been considerable discussion about exactly how harmful e-cigarette use is compared 
to cigarette smoking, both to users and non-users, and about the extent to which: (a) 
smokers are using e-cigarettes to quit all cigarette or nicotine use or at least to switch 
completely to using only e-cigarettes; (b) youths who would not otherwise experiment 
with smoking or tobacco use are experimenting with e-cigarette use or becoming 
e-cigarette users; (c) cigarette smokers are engaging in dual use with e-cigarettes; and 
(d) former smokers are relapsing into addicted e-cigarette use. There are also questions 
about the degree to which experimentation and use of e-cigarettes serves as a gateway 
into addicted smoking and the extent to which former smoker relapse into e-cigarette 
use is a stepping stone back into regular smoking. Other questions concern whether 
smoker dual use with e-cigarettes or switching entirely to regular e-cigarette use might 
actually be interim steps toward quitting all smoking or all tobacco and nicotine use.15
While clearer, more complete answers to these questions would be interesting and 
informative, they are not necessary for determining the most effective way to structure 
the regulation of e-cigarettes and their marketing. Nor do these kinds of questions need 
to be answered before effective new e-cigarette regulations are drafted and implemented. 
All we need know to move forward constructively is the following:
1. Regardless of exactly how harmful the different types of currently available 
e-cigarettes are, it is already clear that e-cigarette use is, overall, at least 
somewhat less harmful to users and non-users than smoking.16 That means 
public health gains are secured each time a smoker who would not otherwise 
quit all smoking switches entirely to using e-cigarettes instead.17 Moreover, 
available data shows that switches from smoking to exclusive e-cigarette use 
Review Paper in Circulation on Ecigs, Center for tobaCCo Control res. & eduC. blog (Sept. 24, 2014, 02:19 
PM), https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/response-mcneill-et-al-criticism-report-we-prepared-who-and-subsequent-
review-paper-circulation-ecigs. 
15 See e.g., Walton et al., supra note 13; Grana et al., supra note 3, at 1983. 
16 See e.g., Charlotta Pisinger & Martin Dossing, A Systematic Review of Health Effects of Electronic 
Cigarettes, 69 preventive med. 248, 257 (2014); Konstantinos E. Farsalinos & Riccardo Polosa, Safety 
Evaluation and Risk Assessment of Electronic Cigarettes as Tobacco Cigarette Substitutes: A Systematic 
Review, 5 tHerapeutiC advanCes drug safety 67, 67 (2014); Hajek et al., supra note 2; Stephen Hecht et 
al., Evaluation of Toxicant and Carcinogen Metabolites in the Urine of E-cigarette Users Versus Cigarette 
Smokers, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7) (on file with Food & Drug L.J.); 
Maciej Lukasz Goniewicz et al., Levels of Selected Carcinogens and Toxicants in Vapour from Electronic 
Cigarettes, 23 tobaCCo Control 133, 133 (2014). In regard to secondhand exposure, as the previously cited 
studies show, e-cigarette aerosol vapor contains fewer toxins and generally lower levels of those it does contain 
compared to tobacco smoke. In addition, people near e-cigarette users face less secondhand exposure than 
persons near cigarette smokers because e-cigarettes do not produce any secondhand aerosol vapor directly 
from the e-cigarette, itself (i.e., no parallel to cigarette sidestream smoke) but only produce secondhand vapor 
from what the e-cigarette user inhales and then exhales (which is filtered through the user’s lungs prior to 
release). See, e.g., Jan Czogala, Secondhand Exposure to Vapors from Electronic Cigarettes, 16 niCotine & 
tobaCCo res. 655, 655–60 (2014); see also Ingrid Torjesen, E-cigarette Vapour Could Damage Health of 
Non-Smokers, 349 bmJ 6882 (2014), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/349/bmj.g6882. 
17 Unless it were an interim stage toward complete switching (or complete cessation), dual use with 
no reduction in smoking would not produce any health benefits and could increase overall harms. But it is 
possible that long-term dual use where the e-cigarette consumption sharply reduced the number of cigarettes 
smoked (e.g., by 50%) could secure some health benefits to the user, at least among heavy smokers. See, 
e.g., Carole Hart et al., Does Smoking Reduction in Midlife Reduce Mortality Risk? Results of 2 Long-term 
Prospective Cohort Studies of Men and Women in Scotland, 178 am. J. of epidemiology 770, 770 (2013) 
(also citing numerous studies). Such sharp smoking declines through using e-cigarettes would likely reduce 
secondhand smoke exposure, and possibly related harms, as well. But e-cigarette use that only modestly or 
temporarily reduced the number of cigarettes smoked (and did not move the user toward complete switching 
or cessation) would not likely secure any significant health benefits. Id. 
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are possible and already occurring, at least to some extent.18 Related research 
indicates that using e-cigarettes, either exclusively or through dual use, can help 
smokers to quit smoking,19 or even prompt some smokers not trying to quit to 
reduce their smoking or stop.20 There is also some evidence that smokers who 
successfully use e-cigarettes to help them quit smoking are likely subsequently 
to stop using the e-cigarettes as well.21 
2. Regardless of how harmful e-cigarettes currently are or are not, they could 
readily be made considerably less harmful and risky. For example, many 
e-cigarettes contain contaminants or other harmful or potentially harmful 
ingredients unnecessary for their operation, there have been reports of 
e-cigarettes exploding because of misuse or improper design or manufacture, 
and nicotine poisoning among children and others from e-cigarette liquids 
that could be sold in sealed or child-proof containers, has been increasing.22 
Addressing just these problems, to start, would reduce the potential harms 
from any e-cigarette use among youth or non-smokers or dual users and 
18 See, e.g., Lois Beiner & Lee Hargrave, A Longitudinal Study of Electronic Cigarette Use in a 
Population-Based Sample of Adult Smokers: Association with Smoking Cessation and Motivation to Quit, 
17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 127 (2015); Carla J. Berg et al., Attitudes Toward E-cigarettes, Reasons for 
Initiating E-cigarette Use, and changes in Smoking Behavior after Initiation: A Pilot Longitudinal Study of 
Regular Cigarette Smokers, 4 open J. preventive med. 789–800 (2014); see also Lila J. Finney Rutten et 
al., Use of E-Cigarettes Among Current Smokers: Associations Among Reasons for Use, Quit Intentions, and 
Current Tobacco Use, niCotine & tobaCCo res. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.
org/content/early/2015/02/10/ntr.ntv003.abstract (advance copy published online ahead of print).  The extent 
to which those switching from smoking to e-cigarette use would have quit smoking anyway, or sooner, or 
later, is not yet clear. 
19 See, e.g., Maria Rosaria Gualano et al., Electronic Cigarettes: Assessing the Efficacy and the 
Adverse Effects Through a Systematic Review of Published Studies, 37 J. pub. HealtH (forthcoming 2015) 
(online PDF manuscript at 9), available at http://jpubhealth.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/08/09/
pubmed.fdu055.abstract (advance copy published online ahead of print); Hayden McRobbie et al., Electronic 
Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation and Reduction, CoCHrane libr. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD010216.pub2/abstract. 
20 See, e.g., Karolien Adriaens et al., Effectiveness of the Electronic Cigarette: An Eight-Week Flemish 
Study with Six-Month Follow-up on Smoking Reduction, Craving and Experienced Benefits and Complaints, 
11 int’l J. envtl. res. & pub. HealtH 11220, 11243 (2014); see also Sara Kalkhoran et al., Dual Use of 
Smokeless Tobacco or E-cigarettes with Cigarettes and Cessation, 39 am. J. HealtH beHav. 276, 280–81 
(2015). 
21 Jessica K. Pepper et al., Reasons for Starting and Stopping Electronic Cigarette Use, 11 int’l J. 
envtl. res. & pub. HealtH 10345, 10354–56 (2014) (three percent of former e-cigarette users surveyed 
stopped because they quit smoking or using nicotine); see also Jonathan Foulds et al., Development of a 
Questionnaire to Assess Dependence on Electronic Cigarettes in a Large Sample of Ex-Smoking E-Cig 
Users, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 186, 190 (2015) (“[T]he most parsimonious explanation of these results 
is that e-cig users are generally less nicotine dependent than they were as cigarette smokers.”). But see Jean-
Francois Etter, Explaining the Effects of Electronic Cigarettes on Craving for Tobacco in Recent Quitters, 
148 drug & alCoHol dependenCe 102, 106 (2015) (e-cigarettes that provide high levels of nicotine are the 
most satisfactory to smokers and best reduce craving for tobacco but also create stronger dependence).
22 On e-cigarette contaminants, and other unsafe features, see, e.g., David Barboza, China’s E-cigarette 
Boom Lacks Oversight for Safety: Producing 90 Percent of World’s Devices, With Hazards for Health Users, 
n.y. times, Dec. 14, 2014, at A1; Igor Burstyn, Peering Through the Mist: Systematic Review of What the 
Chemistry of Contaminants in Electronic Cigarettes Tells us About Health Risks, 14 bmC pub. HealtH 18 
(2014). On unnecessary ingredients that likely cause harm, see, e.g., Konstantinos Farsalinos et al., Evaluation 
of Electronic Cigarette Liquids and Aerosol for the Presence of Selected Inhalation Toxins, 17 niCotine & 
tobaCCo res. 168, 173 (2015). On nicotine poisoning, see, e.g., J.P. Vakkalanka et al., Epidemiological 
Trends in Electronic Cigarette Exposures Reported to U.S. Poison Centers, 52 CliniCal toxiCology 542, 
542 (2014). On explosions, see, e.g., Dana Liebelson & Asawin Suebsaeng, Should You Be Worried About 
Your E-cigarette Exploding?, motHer Jones (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2014/04/e-cigarettes-explode-fda-timeline. 
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would increase the potential benefits from each smoker that switches to using 
e-cigarettes. 
3. Even if made much less harmful, e-cigarettes will still be addictive and deliver 
nicotine and other ingredients in aerosol form directly into user’s lungs and, to 
some degree, into the lungs of exposed non-users. Consequently, we already 
know that using e-cigarettes is and likely always will be more harmful to users 
and exposed nonusers than no tobacco or nicotine use or exposure at all.23 That 
means public health risks and harms occur every time anyone uses e-cigarettes 
other than smokers who would not otherwise have quit all tobacco and nicotine 
use. Moreover, available data shows that this kind of harmful new initiation is 
not only possible but already occurring to some extent among youth (including 
those who have not tried smoking), adults who have never tried smoking, and 
former smokers who had previously quit all tobacco and nicotine use.24 There 
is also some evidence that never-smokers who use e-cigarettes are more open 
to trying smoking than never-smokers who do not use e-cigarettes, but whether 
it is the e-cigarette use or some other pre-existing factors that makes them more 
open to smoking is not yet clear.25 Regardless, available facts tell us that any 
e-cigarette use by youth, non-smokers or by smokers who would otherwise 
23 There is a large body of research on harms from consuming or inhaling nicotine. See, e.g., u.s. 
dep’t HealtH & Human servs., tHe HealtH ConseQuenCes of smoking—50 years of progress: a report 
of tHe surgeon general ch. 5 (2014) [hereinafter surgeon general report 2014]. On the harms and risks 
from e-cigarette use in particular, see, e.g., Pisinger & Dossing, supra note 16, at 249; Goniewicz et al., 
supra note 16, at 133; and Hecht et al., supra note 16, at 6 (higher levels of certain carcinogens and toxins 
in urine of e-cigarette users compared to non-users of tobacco or nicotine); see also Melissa A. Suter et al., 
Is There Evidence for Potential Harm of Electronic Cigarette Use in Pregnancy?, birtH defeCts res. part 
a: CliniCal & moleCular teratology (2014); Jessica L. Barrington-Trimis et al., Flavorings in Electronic 
Cigarettes: An Unrecognized Respiratory Health Hazard?, 312 JAMA 2493 (2014); am. indus. Hygiene 
ass’n, indoor envt’l. Quality Comm. & risk assessment Comm., wHite paper: eleCtroniC Cigarettes in 
tHe indoor environment (Oct. 19, 2014), available at https://www.aiha.org/government-affairs/Documents/
Electronc%20Cig%20Document_Final.pdf; Maciej L. Goniewicz & Lily Lee, Electronic Cigarettes Are a 
Source of Thirdhand Exposure to Nicotine, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 256, 258 (2015) (“Our work suggests 
that thirdhand exposure to nicotine is possible not just from tobacco cigarettes, but also e-cigarettes.”). 
24 For example, recent Monitoring the Future data shows that more than twice as many tenth 
graders currently use e-cigarettes vs. currently smoke, with seven percent in that grade currently using 
e-cigarettes but never having smoked cigarettes (a percentage that is too large to consist of only tenth 
graders who would otherwise be smokers). L.D. Johnston et al., Press Release: E-cigarettes Surpass Tobacco 
Cigarettes Among Teens, univ. miCH. news (Dec. 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.monitoringthefuture.
org/pressreleases/14cigpr.pdf (related data tables at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/data/14data.
html#2014data-cigs); see also Suchitra Krishnan-Sarin et al., E-cigarette Use among High School and 
Middle School Adolescents in Connecticut, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. (forthcoming 2015), available 
at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/12/02/ntr.ntu243.full (advance copy published online 
ahead of print); Samir Soneji, Multiple Tobacco Product Use Among U.S. Adolescents and Young Adults, 24 
tobaCCo Control (forthcoming 2015), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/12/14/
tobaccocontrol-2014-051913 (advance copy published online ahead of print). On e-cigarette use by non-
smoker adults, see, e.g., Erin L. Sutfin et al., Electronic Cigarette Use by College Students, 131 drug & 
alCoHol dependenCe 214 (2013) (also finding that e-cigarette use by college smokers was not associated 
with intentions to quit); Robert C. McMillen et al., Trends in Electronic Cigarette Use Among U.S. Adults: 
Use is Increasing in Both Smokers and Nonsmokers, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/11/28/ntr.ntu213 (advance copy published online 
ahead of print); Robert C. McMillen et al., Recorded Presentation: Susceptibility to Electronic Cigarette Use 
Among Current Nonsmokers, am. pub. HealtH ass’n (Nov. 17, 2014), https://apha.confex.com/apha/142am/
webprogram/Paper297773.html. 
25 See, e.g., Rebecca Bunnell et al., Intentions to Smoke Cigarettes Among Never-Smoking U.S. Middle 
and High School Electronic Cigarette Users, National Youth Tobacco Survey, 2011–2013, 17 niCotine & 
tobaCCo res. 228, 230 (2015); Blair N. Coleman et al., Association Between Electronic Cigarette Use and 
Openness to Cigarette Smoking Among U.S. Young Adults, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 212, 214 (2015). 
It is also likely that e-cigarette users who become addicted to nicotine and are used to inhaling it into their 
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have quit all tobacco and nicotine use produces at least some not insignificant 
public health harms and risks.
Unless new research somehow establishes that e-cigarette use is either already risk free 
(which is impossible) or is not and cannot be made significantly less harmful and risky 
to users and non-users than smoking (which is extremely unlikely if not impossible), 
what we already know about e-cigarettes tells us that to maximize public health gains, 
an effective regulatory scheme should seek to: 
1. make e-cigarettes even less harmful to users and non-users; 
2. increase their use as a cessation aid or as a substitute for smoking among 
smokers who would not otherwise quit all tobacco and nicotine use; and 
3. minimize e-cigarette use among all other persons.26
III. A propoSeD MoDeL for reGULAtInG e-cIGAretteS bASeD 
on whAt we know now
The less harmful e-cigarettes are made, the larger their potential upside (i.e., larger 
risk reductions from smokers switching to e-cigarette use) and the smaller their potential 
downside (e.g., reduced harms from other new e-cigarette use). How to make e-cigarettes 
as minimally harmful as is possible or practical is complicated because there are many 
different mechanisms and designs. Nevertheless, simple foundational steps to make 
e-cigarettes much less harmful or risky could be implemented immediately. New laws 
or regulations could, for example, require child-proof packaging for e-cigarette liquids 
to prevent accidental nicotine poisoning (as a recent New York State law has done); 
prohibit combustion in e-cigarettes (which can create or increase exposure to toxins or 
even cause the e-cigarettes to explode); require clear instructions for use (to prevent 
nicotine poisoning and product explosions from misuse); prohibit potentially harmful 
contaminants in the nicotine-containing liquids; and ban ingredients, other than nicotine 
or any other ingredients necessary to the operation of the e-cigarette, that might be 
harmful when converted from liquid to aerosol form and inhaled.27 Another option 
might be to limit the voltage or temperatures that e-cigarettes can produce to turn their 
liquid into aerosol vapor, as there is evidence that high temperatures and voltages can 
expose users to higher, more harmful levels of formaldehyde than cigarettes, and viable 
lower voltages and temperatures produce no exposure.28
lungs would be more likely to try cigarettes and become regular smokers than people who are not addicted 
to nicotine.
26 For both ethical and practical reasons, a possible fourth goal has been omitted: Increase youth and 
adult experimentation with e-cigarettes instead of with smoking in order to increase their initiation into 
e-cigarette use instead of into smoking. It is difficult to see how this goal could be directly promoted without 
marketing e-cigarettes to youth, or allowing such marketing, which would inevitably encourage e-cigarette 
experimentation and use not only among otherwise youth smokers but also among youth who would otherwise 
not smoke or use any tobacco or nicotine products. Moreover, it might be that some youth who would 
otherwise experiment and initiate into smoking would, under the regulatory framework proposed here, still 
initiate into e-cigarette use without additional encouragement to try e-cigarettes. But if the implementation of 
this regulatory framework were followed by reductions in youth e-cigarette use and corresponding increases 
in youth smoking, adjustments might be necessary. 
27 Even if contaminants or other unnecessary ingredients in e-cigarettes were not prevalent or, at existing 
levels, were determined not to present serious health risks, prohibiting more than insignificant trace levels 
would prevent higher levels, with related harms, from appearing in the future, and could also be a useful 
proxy toward ensuring good manufacturing practices and generally safer e-cigarettes. 
28 R. Paul Jensen et al., Letters, Hidden Formaldehyde in E-cigarette Aerosols, 372 new eng. J. med. 
392, 392 (2015).
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Achieving the two other regulatory goals for e-cigarettes is more complicated because 
it requires carefully regulating advertising. It is well established that product advertising 
in general, and tobacco product advertising in particular, prompts experimentation and 
increases or maintains use.29 In fact, some of the e-cigarette advertising in the United 
States today closely resembles the irresponsible ways that cigarettes used to be advertised 
before new laws, lawsuits and settlements, and public pressure, reined in the cigarette 
companies.30 That tells us that if e-cigarette advertising is not substantially regulated and 
restricted, it will increase initiation among youth and non-smoking adults.31 Unrestricted 
e-cigarette advertising is also likely to include efforts to promote e-cigarettes as long-
term complements to smoking through dual use (e.g., to be used when and where smokers 
may not smoke) or to reduce cessation among smokers. On the other hand, the power 
of advertising to influence consumer behavior tells us that, to maximize public health 
gains, e-cigarette advertising should still be allowed to reach those smokers who would 
not otherwise quit for the purpose of encouraging them to use e-cigarettes as either a 
quitting aid or a less harmful way to obtain nicotine.
Resolving these conflicts is difficult (even if we temporarily put aside the First 
Amendment issues). Ideally, e-cigarette advertising would be regulated so that it reached 
only: (1) those smokers who would not otherwise stop (to encourage only constructive, 
harm-reducing e-cigarette use by those smokers); (2) those former smokers who have 
switched to e-cigarettes (to keep them from relapsing into smoking); and, perhaps, 
(3) current, addicted e-cigarette users who have never smoked (to prevent them from 
moving to smoking as a more effective or desirable way to feed their e-cigarette-
based nicotine addiction).32 While that cannot be done precisely, it could be closely 
approximated by allowing e-cigarette advertising, for the most part, only through direct 
communications (such as email, text messages or regular mail) to pre-verified current 
adult smokers (including dual users), to pre-verified adult former smokers who are 
now using only e-cigarettes, and, possibly, to other pre-verified adults who daily or 
regularly use e-cigarettes.33 
29 In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, for example, the United States Supreme Court stated that “we 
have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while suppressed 
advertising may have the opposite effect,” and noted that the Massachusetts Attorney General had cited 
“numerous studies to support this theory in the case of tobacco products.” 533 U.S. 525, 560–61 (2001). Since 
then, the research and other evidence showing that tobacco product advertising increases prevalence and use 
and restricting that advertising reduces it has grown considerably. See, e.g., Lisa Henricksen, Comprehensive 
Tobacco Marketing Restrictions: Promotion, Packaging, Price and Place, 21 tobaCCo Control 147, 149 
(2012); see also Tobacco Control Act Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(15)–(23), 123 Stat. 1777 (2009) [hereinafter 
Tobacco Act Findings (15)–(23)] (Congressional findings). For example, finding (15) states, “Advertising, 
marketing, and promotion of tobacco products have been especially directed to attract young persons to use 
tobacco products, and these efforts have resulted in increased use of such products by youth,” and Finding 
(22) states, “Tobacco advertising expands the size of the tobacco market by increasing consumption of tobacco 
products.” Id.
30 See, e.g., Press Release: Durbin, Waxman, Harkin, Rockefeller & Members Of Congress: Report 
Shows E-cigarette Marketing Campaigns Lighting Up Among Young Users, u.s. senator diCk durbin 
(Apr.14, 2014), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=06acef25-48b0-4d9a-
857a-74f7b4fcd4d5 [hereinafter Press Release from Senators]; see also Jennifer C. Duke et al., Exposure to 
Electronic Cigarette Television Advertisements Among Youth and Young Adults, 134 pediatriCs 29, 30 (2013).
31 Specific to e-cigarette advertising, see, e.g., Pallav Pokhrel et al., Receptivity to E-cigarette Marketing, 
Harm Perceptions, and E-cigarette Use, 39 am. J. HealtH beHav. 121, 129 (2015). See generally, e.g., u.s. 
dep’t HealtH & Human servs., preventing tobaCCo use among youtH and young adults: a report of 
tHe surgeon general, ch. 5 (2012) [hereinafter surgeon general report 2012]. 
32 On whether e-cigarette use by never smokers might lead to smoking, see, e.g., Coleman et al., supra 
note 25; Bunnell et al., supra note 25, at 10.
33 Such pre-verification would be relatively easy to require or do. Many tobacco product businesses 
already have extensive lists of known or likely smokers or e-cigarette users, and similar lists could be readily 
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A major benefit of this approach is that it does not try to regulate separately all the 
different possible forms of e-cigarette advertising – ranging from Internet and television 
and other broadcast ads to ads in magazines to billboards and displays and ads at retail 
outlets—which could be quite complicated to structure, implement and enforce. Instead, 
it would prohibit all the different forms of publicly visible e-cigarette advertising (with 
some minor exceptions described below) and allow e-cigarette advertising only in 
direct communications to verified adult smokers, where it can both do the least harm 
and do the most good.  
The proposed restrictions would be directed primarily to prevent e-cigarette 
advertising from encouraging e-cigarette initiation among youth or among adults who 
would otherwise never use tobacco or nicotine. But prohibiting this publicly visible 
advertising, including product displays at retail, would also help to prevent former 
smokers who had quit all tobacco or nicotine use from relapsing into e-cigarette use 
(which might then lead to a relapse back to smoking). It would also work to reduce 
e-cigarette use among non-smoking smokeless tobacco users.34 
For the same reasons, this approach would also prohibit the delivery of any e-cigarette 
advertising through direct communications to anyone other than adult smokers or 
former smokers currently using e-cigarettes. Given the public health goal of allowing 
e-cigarette advertising only to encourage and sustain complete switching to e-cigarettes 
from smoking, there would be no public health justification for allowing the delivery 
of e-cigarette advertising to anyone else, with the possible exception of regular current 
e-cigarette users who have never smoked but might be at risk of becoming smokers 
because of their nicotine addiction. 
Allowing direct e-cigarette advertising to existing adult smokers would, however, still 
allow the e-cigarette advertising to reach those current smokers who would otherwise 
quit successfully in the near future, possibly encouraging them to switch, instead. But 
there is currently no way to predict accurately who among the many smokers trying or 
planning to quit at any particular time will be among the small minority that actually 
quits successfully in the near future. Consequently, there is no practical way to exclude 
them from receiving the direct e-cigarette advertising without also excluding many 
more smokers who could benefit from receiving the advertising and being prompted 
to switch. For example, the direct e-cigarette advertising could be restricted not just 
to adult smokers but only to those adult smokers who also confirm that they are not 
currently trying to quit or planning to quit in the near future. That would sharply reduce 
exposure to the e-cigarette advertising among smokers who would otherwise quit. But 
compiled (e.g., by website or e mail surveys) or purchased from existing vendors. See, e.g., Smokers Email 
Masterfile List, nextmark, inC., http://lists.nextmark.com/market?page=order/online/datacard&id=130172 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Smokers Email Masterfile] (including e-cigarette user segment and also 
offering mail and phone lists). In addition, software to verify that people with a specific name and associated 
address or e mail address are adults are also commercially available. See, e.g., Aristotle Industries Integrity 
ID and Age Verification Products, integrity, http://integrity.aristotle.com/products (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). 
With these and other resources, e-cigarette sellers could both direct e-cigarette advertising only to verified 
adult smokers or former smokers who currently use e-cigarettes and could expand their lists of qualified 
recipients of that advertising by e mailing or otherwise contacting verified adults, perhaps targeting those 
known or likely to be smokers or e-cigarette users, to confirm whether they are adult smokers or former 
smokers now using e-cigarettes. As a safety net, the e-cigarette sellers could also be required to include in 
their advertising messages a way that recipients could inform the sellers if they are not adults or are not 
current smokers or former-smoker e-cigarette users or could otherwise opt out of receiving the advertising.
34 It is not yet clear whether a switch from using only smokeless tobacco to using only e-cigarettes 
would produce any significant health gains or losses for the users. But a switch from using just smokeless 
(with no secondhand exposure) to just e-cigarettes would expose nearby non-users to at least some increased 
risk of harm. Starting to consumer nicotine through the lungs through e-cigarette use might also increase the 
likelihood that a non-smoking smokeless user will progress into smoking.
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it would also stop the ads from directly reaching the far larger group of smokers who 
say they are trying or planning to quit but will not actually do so. Because they do not 
want to smoke, but would not otherwise quit, these smokers are probably the most likely 
to respond beneficially to receive e-cigarette advertising that encourages switching.35 
At the same time, the risk that the e-cigarette advertising communications might 
induce some smokers who would otherwise quit entirely to use e-cigarettes could be 
reduced by requiring the communications to include factual disclosures that make the 
following points: 
• Smoking harms both the user and exposed family, friends and colleagues.
• The most effective way to minimize health harms and risks and maximize health 
improvements is by quitting all smoking and all other tobacco use altogether.
• E-cigarette use, while less harmful than smoking, is still harmful and risky.
• Smokers who cannot quit all tobacco use can still significantly reduce the amount of 
harm their tobacco use causes to themselves and others by switching from smoking 
to using e-cigarettes—but they must switch completely and stop all smoking to 
secure those health gains.
• More information and assistance about smoking health harms and the benefits 
from quitting can be obtained from 1-800-QUIT-NOW and at www.smokefree.gov. 
This supplementary messaging to discourage switching instead of total cessation 
would also increase the chances that the advertising communications would work to 
prompt complete switching among those smokers who would not otherwise quit and 
to discourage dual use for any purpose other than a step toward switching or to total 
cessation. It would also help to prevent relapse among former smokers who have 
switched entirely to e-cigarettes, and would discourage never-smoking regular e-cigarette 
users from trying or using smoking to feed their nicotine addiction. Including this 
messaging in the e-cigarette advertising delivered directly to smokers and nonsmoking 
regular e-cigarette users would also reduce the risks of increasing initiation among any 
other nonsmokers or any youth who might end up seeing the ads, as well.36
In the United States, possible First Amendment constraints on compelling commercial 
speech could be avoided if this required additional messaging were made entirely 
factual and accurate and purely informational, and were identified as coming from the 
government (not the e-cigarette manufacturers or sellers).37
35 In any given year, close to seventy percent of all smokers say they are interested in quitting, but only 
about fifty percent actually try to do so, and only about six percent successfully quit for at least six months. 
Ann Malarcher et al., Quitting Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2001–2010, morbidity & mortality 
wkly. rep. (Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 11, 2011, at 1513–19. That means 
that any e-cigarette advertising that excluded all smokers who say they are trying to quit or plan to do so 
soon would fail to reach more than 10 non-quitting smokers to encourage them to switch instead of smoke 
for every one otherwise quitter it avoided exposing to the e-cigarette ads for fear of inducing them to switch 
instead of quit. That lopsided ratio suggests that allowing the direct e-cigarette advertising communications 
to all verified current adult smokers would produce larger net public health benefits than allowing the ads 
only to pre-verified smokers who say they are not trying or planning to quit.
36 Such nonsmokers and youth might see the ads if they are misdirected or if they are exposed to the 
ads after they are received by the targeted pre-verified adult recipients. Those most likely to be exposed 
would probably be close friends or members of the same family or household as the intended adult smoker 
or regular e-cigarette user recipients. But, because of that association, it is also likely that these unintended, 
secondary recipients of the ads would be smokers or former smoker e-cigarette users, themselves, or at risk 
of becoming smokers—which means that their exposure to the ads might also help to prevent or reduce 
smoking. 
37 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric, 760 F.3d 18 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (overruling the holding in Reynolds v. FDA that the less-stringent Zauderer test for meeting 
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To increase potential public health benefits—and avoid possible First Amendment 
concerns about restricting commercial speech that does not threaten to increase initiation 
or reduce cessation—the e-cigarette sellers could also be permitted to communicate 
directly with doctors and other medical professionals about the possible health benefits 
from recommending that patients who smoke switch entirely to using e-cigarettes if 
they cannot or will not otherwise stop smoking.38
First Amendment concerns could be reduced even further by also providing some 
exceptions to the ban on publicly viewable e-cigarette advertising to enable retailers to 
notify potential legal customers that they sell e-cigarettes and to enable legal consumers 
to find and buy e-cigarettes.39 An effective way to do that, while still minimizing any 
advertising that would attract youth or expose other at-risk consumers, would be to 
prohibit e-cigarette product displays and advertising at sales outlets but allow retailers 
to have a limited number of outdoor and indoor text-only signs, restricted in size, that 
could state only that e-cigarettes were available for sale at that location. If desired by 
the retailer, the permitted signs could also list the specific brands and their prices or 
state that additional information was available upon request to current adult smokers and 
regular e-cigarette users. Similar text could also be allowed in other retailer-sponsored 
advertising for the store, such as newspaper flyers.40 
To avoid First Amendment concerns about restrictions on the content of commercial 
speech, it would be helpful to minimize any restrictions on the content of either the 
materials provided upon request at sales outlet or in the e-cigarette ads delivered directly 
to pre-verified adult current smokers and regular e-cigarette users (so long as it was 
not false or misleading).41 But if First Amendment constraints were not applicable, or 
could be accommodated, it would be constructive to prohibit the e-cigarette materials 
or ads from including any messaging that suggested that e-cigarettes be used instead of 
quitting all tobacco and nicotine use or to complement or supplement smoking, instead 
of as an alternative. The ads could be left free to say nothing about smoking or to make 
accurate statements about possible risk reductions from using e-cigarettes exclusively 
instead of smoking. But e-cigarette ads such as those stating “Why Quit? Switch to 
First Amendment standards applies only to compelled speech directed at the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers). 
38 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002) (stating that one of the 
reasons an FDA ban on the advertising of pharmacist-compounded drugs was unconstitutional was that it 
would prevent pharmacists from telling doctors about the drugs and their potential benefits to the doctors’ 
patients). 
39 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, where the United States Supreme Court struck down state 
restrictions on tobacco product advertising because the restrictions were overbroad and failed to appropriately 
take account of the fact that “tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful 
information about their products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful 
information about tobacco products,” noting, among other factors, that the restrictions could leave some 
retailers with “no means of communicating to passersby on the street that it sells tobacco products.” 533 
U.S. 525, 565 (2001). See also the concurrence by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, noting that the 
restrictions would even “prohibit a store from accurately stating the prices at which cigarettes are sold.” 533 
U.S. at 578.
40 In Lorillard, the Court was troubled by the state law allowing retailers to have only a single 576 
square-inch outdoor sign that stated “Tobacco Products Sold Here” in black text on white background. 533 
U.S. 525, 585 (2001). The permitted signage proposed here would be much more extensive. 
41 On potentially heightened judicial scrutiny for commercial speech restrictions that are content-based, 
see e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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Blue,”42 or promoting long-term dual use-cigarettes as a tobacco or nicotine product 
that smokers could use when and where they cannot smoke would not be permitted.43 
With those possible exceptions, however, retailers could be left largely free to 
provide, upon request, whatever additional information or materials relating to the 
e-cigarettes they desired (e.g., verbally, by providing brochures or colorful ads, or by 
allowing consumers to handle the products or their packaging). But the sellers would 
be allowed to make the materials available only upon request to verified adults who 
state that they are smokers or regular e-cigarette users, and would be required also to 
provide the previously outlined factual disclosures regarding smoking harms and the 
need to switch exclusively to e-cigarettes (or quit all use) to secure significant health 
benefits.44 With the same possible exceptions, sellers could also be left largely free 
to advertise their e-cigarettes any way that they wanted in the e-cigarette advertising 
delivered only through direct communications to pre-verified adult smokers and regular 
e-cigarette users (as long as the factual disclosures were included).  
All of this permitted e-cigarette advertising would still have to comply with other 
restrictions and requirements in existing federal, state and local consumer protection 
and other laws, which typically prohibit false or misleading advertising (which is not 
protected by the First Amendment). While those laws have not yet been regularly 
enforced against e-cigarettes, once e-cigarettes are subject to FDA’s tobacco product 
authority, the agency could take steps to ensure that all e-cigarette advertising complies 
with the Tobacco Control Act’s prohibition against false or misleading tobacco product 
advertising.45 
In countries that currently ban all tobacco product advertising or sharply restrict it, 
allowing e-cigarette advertising directly to current smokers and to e-cigarette users who 
are former smokers would give e-cigarettes a powerful competitive advantage over 
cigarettes. But even in countries, such as the United States, where cigarette advertising 
is not prohibited or restricted as sharply, limiting e-cigarette advertising to direct 
42 A copy of the Blu e-cigarette ad with this phrase, which ran in 2011, can be viewed online. Rutgers 
Sch. of Pub. Health, trinkets & trasH, http://www.trinketsandtrash.org/viewImage.php?file_name=213543.
jpg (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). The Blu electronic cigarette company is a subsidiary of Lorillard, Inc. (www.
lorillard.com), also owner of the third largest cigarette company in the United States, Lorillard Tobacco 
Company, maker of Newport cigarettes.
43 For examples of ads about being able to use e-cigarettes where smoking is prohibited see Stanford 
School of Medicine’s online collection of “Smoke Anywhere” e-cigarette ads. Stanford Research into the 
Impact of Tobacco Advertising, stanford sCHool med., http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/index.php 
(follow “E-cigs” hyperlink at top of page; then follow “Electronic Cigarette Ad Gallery” hyperlink; then 
follow “Freedom” hyperlink; then follow “Social Appeal” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
44 Similar to bricks-and-mortar retailers, internet sellers could have only text notifications that they 
sell e-cigarettes on their publicly accessible website pages. But, subject to the same possible exceptions, they 
could, for the most part, have any e-cigarette advertising they wished on website pages that (using readily 
available age and ID verification software) could be accessed only by pre-verified adults who also state that 
they are current smokers or regular e-cigarette users. But the internet retailers would also be required to 
display the factual disclosures, or provide ready access to them, on those webpages. E-cigarette advertising 
inside adult-only retail outlets that primarily sell tobacco products might also be similarly unrestricted, but 
that would increase exposure to the ads among adults who are not current smokers, former smokers who now 
use e-cigarettes or other regular e-cigarette users. For more on this general approach to restricting tobacco 
product advertising at retail, see Micah Berman et al., Tobacco Product Display Restrictions, Center for 
pub. HealtH l. & tobaCCo pol’y (Oct. 2010), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
nycenter-syn-tobproductdisplaybans-2013.pdf (last updated Apr. 2012). 
45 21 U.S.C. § 387c(a)(1) (2012). At that time, FDA could also make sure that any permitted e-cigarette 
advertising did not violate the Act’s prohibition against reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claims without 
a prior permissive order from FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 387k (2012). But given the goal of prompting current 
smokers who would not otherwise quit to switch to e-cigarette use, it might make sense to avoid impeding 
any reduced-risk claims made only to smokers that were not false or misleading. 
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communications to current smokers and certain former smokers should be enough to 
help prompt constructive switching to e-cigarette use. By itself, such direct advertising 
can be quite powerful, especially when allowed to make certain accurate reduced-risk 
claims. In addition, the vast majority of current smokers already view smoking as harmful 
and already want to quit, making them a relatively easy target for such e-cigarette 
advertising. Moreover, the ability of this direct advertising to prompt constructive 
switching (and prevent relapse to smoking) would likely depend, ultimately, less on 
the strengths or limitations of the advertising and more on the ability of e-cigarettes to 
offer an alternative that smokers would find attractive or at least acceptable.46
It might appear odd to some that the approach proposed here would restrict e-cigarette 
advertising and other marketing more severely than existing restrictions in the United 
States on cigarette advertising. But it does so precisely to make e-cigarettes and their 
advertising more effective anti-smoking tools. But placing similar constraints on cigarette 
sales and advertising would certainly make sense from a public health perspective—and 
much of the First Amendment analysis provided in this paper, especially if expanded 
and improved by others, should help to support efforts to do that.
In addition, other restrictions or requirements on e-cigarettes might be added to 
the regulatory approach proposed here, such as prohibiting their use in all smoke-free 
locations or banning e-cigarette flavors that could attract youth—if doing that would 
discourage e-cigarette use among youth and non-smokers and not disproportionately 
reduce constructive e-cigarette use as an alternative to smoking.47 Another option 
to prevent youth initiation might be establishing or raising taxes on e-cigarettes, 
or taking other action to increase their minimum prices, so long as that would not 
46 Thanks to market competition, e-cigarette manufacturers would continue existing efforts to make 
e-cigarettes deliver nicotine to users in ways that are as attractive to smokers as possible.  See, e.g., William 
V. Lechner et al., The Comparative Efficacy of 1st vs.2nd Generation Electronic Cigarettes in Reducing 
Symptoms of Nicotine Withdrawal, addiCtion (forthcoming 2015), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/add.12870/abstract (advance copy published online ahead of print).  Indeed, the regulatory 
scheme here would likely accelerate those efforts because it would severely limit the companies’ ability to 
market e-cigarettes to anyone other than smokers and former smokers. Constructive switching to e-cigarettes 
by smokers could be further enhanced by new government efforts to make cigarettes less attractive to smokers, 
which could range from plain packaging requirements and counter-marketing campaigns to banning menthol 
in cigarettes (but not e-cigarettes) or minimizing nicotine levels in cigarettes. 
47 Given that smokers in the United States already cannot smoke in smoke-free areas and rarely 
consume flavors other than tobacco and menthol, applying those additional restrictions to e-cigarettes and 
their use should not impede smoker switching to e-cigarette use as a less-harmful source of nicotine, much 
less as a cessation aid. But it is at least possible that allowing e-cigarette use in smoke-free areas or allowing 
flavored e-cigarettes might do more to encourage smokers to use e-cigarettes than increase e-cigarette or 
smoking initiation among youth—and, consequently, might produce a net public health gain (if preventing 
brand new youth harms is not given more weight than reducing harms among existing adult smokers). 
Moreover, the proposed e-cigarette advertising restrictions—by limiting youth exposure to e-cigarette 
advertising—might make prohibiting e-cigarettes from having flavors that attract youth less important 
for preventing youth experimentation. For a recent study finding that flavors are a major reason for youth 
e-cigarette experimentation, see Grace Kong et al., Reasons for Electronic Cigarette Experimentation and 
Discontinuation Among Adolescents and Young Adults, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res.(forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/12/23/ntr.ntu257 (advance copy published online 
ahead of print). For a contrary finding see, for example, Saul Shiffman, The Impact of Flavor Descriptors 
on Nonsmoking Teens’ and Adult Smokers’ Interest in Electronic Cigarettes, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. 
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/01/24/ntr.ntu333 (advance 
copy published online ahead of print). But see Stanton Glantz, Shiffman et al paper in Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research is not a reliable estimate of effects of ecig flavors, Center for tobaCCo Control res. & eduC. 
blog (feb. 18, 2015, 8:33 pm), http://tobacco.ucsf.edu/shiffman-et-al-paper-nicotine-tobacco-research-not-
reliable-estimate-effects-ecig-flavors; Jessica L. Barrington-Trimis et al., Flavorings in Electronic Cigarettes: 
An Unrecognized Respiratory Health Hazard?, 312 Jama 2493 (2014), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.
com/article.aspx?articleid=1935097. 
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disproportionately dampen smoker switching to e-cigarettes. One constructive approach, 
for example, might be to include even larger increases in the tax rates for cigarettes and 
other smoked tobacco products in any measure that establishes or increases e-cigarette 
taxes. 
IV. how MIGht fDA IMpLeMent thIS propoSeD reGULAtory 
frAMework?
Under existing laws, only FDA has the ability to regulate e-cigarettes and their 
advertising nationwide in as comprehensive a fashion as proposed here.48 To do that, 
however, FDA must actively use its existing authority to regulate certain e-cigarettes 
as drugs or devices and activate and effectively use its separate authority to regulate 
other e-cigarettes as tobacco products. 
Pursuant to a D.C. Circuit Court ruling in 2010, e-cigarettes that are marketed and 
sold for “therapeutic” purposes (i.e., with explicit or implicit “therapeutic” claims, such 
as claims that they will help smokers quit) are subject only to FDA’s jurisdiction over 
drugs and devices, administered by FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER).49 Any such therapeutic e-cigarettes cannot be legally marketed or sold in the 
United States without first obtaining an order from FDA that approves the e-cigarette as 
a safe and effective drug or device. Although they deliver nicotine, a drug, e-cigarettes 
that do not make therapeutic claims may be regulated only under FDA’s authority over 
tobacco products.50
Although e-cigarettes are being advertised in the United States with therapeutic 
claims (e.g., stating that they can help smokers quit),51 FDA has not, since the 2010 
court ruling, pursued any enforcement actions against any manufacturers or importers 
for illegally marketing e-cigarettes with therapeutic claims without the required prior 
48 Other existing federal laws and authorities relating to e-cigarettes are neither comprehensive nor 
being effectively enforced. For example, existing federal law prohibits product advertising that is false or 
misleading to consumers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55 (2012), but the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
which is in charge of enforcing those laws at the federal level, has not taken action against any e-cigarette 
companies. The FTC website, for example, does not appear to include any references to e-cigarettes. See 
fed. trade Commission, www.ftc.gov ( last visited Dec. 5, 2014). 
49 Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
50 It is not clear whether FDA could, under any of its existing authorities, regulate e-cigarettes that 
do not deliver nicotine (or some other drug), or regulate e-cigarette mechanisms sold without nicotine (or 
some other drug) that could be used to inhale nicotine but were not explicitly marketed for that purpose (i.e., 
were labeled and advertised for inhaling aerosols or vapors that did not contain any nicotine or other drug). 
If the agency could not reach all such products as drug-delivery devices or tobacco product accessories or 
through some other means, sellers could actively market these non-nicotine e-cigarettes and devices, perhaps 
including marketing directly to youth, as a way of encouraging and enabling nicotine-based e-cigarette use. 
In addition, the marketing of non-nicotine e-cigarettes and e-cigarette devices can also provide cover for 
the marketing of illicit nicotine-delivery e-cigarettes. In Australia, for example, where no nicotine-delivery 
e-cigarettes may be legally sold, non-nicotine e-cigarettes remain largely unregulated, and there is significant 
non-nicotine and nicotine e-cigarette use. See, e.g., Yong et al., supra note 5.
FDA’s proposed deeming rule does not assert jurisdiction over “accessories” to the newly deemed 
tobacco products, but any product “intended or expected to be used by consumers in the consumption of 
a tobacco product” is not considered an “accessory” but a “tobacco product” and would be subject to the 
deeming rule as proposed. See Deeming Rule, supra note 9, at 23,143.
51 See, for example, “SmokeEnds” e-cigarettes, advertised online with text such as “Our company 
was inspired by a dear friend who smoked three packs of cigarettes a day; he eventually quit, using a similar 
product to ours today. . . I want to help others quit smoking.” smokeends, www.smokeends.com (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2015). 
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order from FDA.52 Nor has there been any public announcement about any e-cigarette 
company having submitted a drug approval application to FDA to obtain such an order 
for any e-cigarettes.53
On its June 2009 effective date, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act (“Tobacco Control Act”) provided FDA with extensive authority to regulate “tobacco 
products” and their manufacture, distribution, marketing and sale to protect the public 
health.54 While it applied those tobacco product authorities only to cigarettes, roll-your-
own cigarette tobacco, and smokeless tobacco products, it also gave FDA authority to 
“deem” any or all other products meeting the statutory definition of “tobacco product” 
to be subject to the Act and to FDA’s active tobacco product regulation.55 On April 14, 
2014, through its Center for Tobacco Products, FDA issued a proposed rule that would 
deem all such tobacco products— including all e-cigarettes marketed without therapeutic 
claims (non-drug e-cigarettes)—to be subject to the Act’s tobacco product requirements 
and to FDA’s tobacco product regulation.56 The public comment period closed on 
August 8, 2014, and FDA is expected to issue the final rule after it has considered all 
the comments, drafted responses, and made any changes to the proposed rule.
E-cigarettes placed under FDA’s active tobacco product jurisdiction through the 
final deeming rule would automatically become subject to the Tobacco Control Act’s 
prohibition against tobacco product free samples, its requirement that tobacco product 
ads or labeling not be false or misleading, and its modified risk provisions, which 
require any manufacturer or importer that wants to market a “modified risk tobacco 
product” (a tobacco product marketed with a reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claim) 
to first obtain a permissive order from FDA, which could include restrictions on how 
the claim could be advertised or otherwise communicated.57 But the proposed rule 
did not include any new restrictions specifically relating to e-cigarette advertising.58 
While the agency could add some new advertising restrictions into the final rule, there 
are legal and practical impediments—and FDA typically does not make its final rules 
52 The fda website page that provides access to all FDA Warning Letters sent to manufacturers and 
importers for suspected violations lists only five warning letters relating to e-cigarettes, all dated September 
8, 2010. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations: Warning Letters, food & drug 
admin., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated Feb. 15, 
2015).
53 While it is possible that such an application has been submitted, but it being held confidential by 
FDA, in many cases, such applications are disclosed by the manufacturer or the industry press.
54 Tobacco Control Act § 901(b), 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b)(2012).
55 Id.
56 Deeming Rule, supra note 9. The proposed rule included an option for consideration that would 
exclude “premium cigars” from being deemed.
57 Tobacco Control Act § 911, 21 U.S.C. § 387k (2012). Tobacco Control Act § 911(h)(4) provides that 
an order permitting the marketing of a modified risk tobacco product order may require “that the product 
comply with requirements relating to the advertising and promotion of the tobacco product.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387k(h)(5) (2012).
58 Many comments submitted on the proposed rule urged FDA to include additional advertising 
restrictions in the final version of the rule. For example, a collection of twenty-four major public health 
groups, including the American Cancer Society and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, proposed that 
the final version of the rule prohibit self-service displays, brand-name sponsorships, and brand names from 
non-tobacco products for all e-cigarettes and other newly deemed products put under FDA’s tobacco product 
jurisdiction, and that the final rule also require advance notice to the agency of any new advertising via the 
Internet or other electronic communications to consumers. See, e.g., Comment from American Academy of 
Family Physicians et al., regarding FDA Proposed Rule: Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, (submitted 
Aug. 8, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0189-79772. 
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stronger than its proposed rules in terms of either protecting the public health or placing 
requirements on the regulated industry.59 
However, the regulatory framework established by the Tobacco Control Act makes 
it possible for FDA to regulate e-cigarettes and their advertising in the ways proposed 
here without including any new advertising restrictions or other provisions in the final 
deeming rule or any other future rulemaking. 
A. FDA’s Enforcement Discretion.
By the explicit terms of the Tobacco Control Act, on the effective date of the final 
FDA deeming rule any currently marketed brand of non-drug e-cigarettes that was 
not commercially marketed in the United States on February 15, 2007 may no longer 
be legally be sold in the United States until its manufacturer or importer submits an 
application to FDA and obtains either a new product order or an order finding that the 
specific brand of e-cigarettes is substantially equivalent to a brand of e-cigarettes that 
was on the market on February 15, 2007.60 As it does not appear that any non-drug 
e-cigarettes currently on the market were commercially marketed on February 15, 
2007 (and none of the e-cigarettes that are not tobacco products have the required FDA 
approvals), all e-cigarettes on the U.S. market will be illegal or prohibited products as 
of the effective date of the final deeming rule. 
Because of this situation, the proposed deeming rule stated that FDA intended, 
after the rule’s effective date, to exercise its enforcement discretion to allow existing 
e-cigarette brands to stay on the market, despite being illegal, if the manufacturers or 
importers submitted a new tobacco product or substantial equivalence application within 
twenty-four months, and would continue to exercise that enforcement discretion until 
FDA processed the application and issued a related order.61 FDA also stated, however, 
that it would “consider revising its compliance policy should the Agency find that doing 
59 Thomas J. Hwang et al., Quantifying the Food and Drug Administration’s Rulemaking Delays 
Highlights the Need for Transparency, 33 HealtH affairs, 309, 309–15 (2014). fda could make the final 
rule stronger by including new advertising restrictions for e-cigarettes if the agency determined that the 
restrictions were “appropriate for the protection of the public health” and consistent with the First Amendment’s 
commercial speech protections; and were “logical outgrowths” from the proposed rule. Tobacco Control Act 
§ 906(d), 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012); see, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
60 21 U.S.C. § 387j (2012). It appears that FDA cannot change or re-interpret this date, and that it could 
be altered only through Congress passing a new law. There also does not appear to be any legislative history that 
explains the intention of Congress in regard to the statute’s February 15, 2007 date and its effect on e-cigarettes 
once deemed to be under FDA’s tobacco product authority. But e-cigarettes were being marketed and sold in 
the United States when Congress debated and passed the Tobacco Control Act into law in the spring of 2009. 
For example, FDA had already exercised its authority over drugs and devices to take enforcement actions 
against e-cigarettes in 2008. See, e.g., Smoking Everywhere v. FDA, 680 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010) aff’d 
sub nom. Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, it appears that Congress knew 
that the tobacco product market was changing, and included e-cigarettes, but, nevertheless, implemented the 
law to provide FDA with authority to regulate the marketplace so that any tobacco product (whether under 
the agency’s original tobacco product jurisdiction or later deemed to be so) that was significantly different, 
from a public health perspective, or just raised “different questions of public health,” compared to the tobacco 
products on the market on February 15, 2007 could not legally be sold in the United States unless FDA 
determined that allowing them on the market would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” 
or could be made so by allowing the marketing only with certain advertising and marketing restrictions. See 
Tobacco Control Act § 910, 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(3), (c)(2) (2012). But see Letter from John A. Boehner et al., 
to the Honorable Sylvia M. Burwell, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 23, 2014), available 
at https://www.scribd.com/document_downloads/249057727?extension=pdf&from=embed&source=embed 
(House leadership urging FDA not to apply the February 15, 2007 grandfather date to e-cigarettes and other 
newly deemed tobacco products). 
61 Deeming Rule, supra note 9.
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so is warranted, such as to better protect the public health.”62 It also specifically asked 
for comments concerning whether it should use its enforcement discretion to provide a 
twenty-four-month or longer grace period for all or some of the newly deemed tobacco 
products that become illegal tobacco products as of the effective date of the final deeming 
rule. FDA also asked whether, in providing such a grace period through enforcement 
discretion, it should take into account different factors, such as whether the product’s 
marketing “is limited to existing adult users of the product” or “is unlikely to be seen 
or received by youth,” or whether the product has different characteristics relating to 
combustibility, toxicity, flavors or nicotine.63
Given these statements in the proposed rule, the door is wide open for FDA to use 
its enforcement discretion to begin establishing the regulatory scheme for e-cigarettes 
that has been proposed here. To begin, FDA could announce that it will exercise its 
enforcement discretion, after the effective date of the final deeming rule, to allow all 
newly illegal non-drug e-cigarettes to remain on the market if the manufacturers or 
importers take the following actions:
• Submit a complete new product or substantial equivalence application (e.g., within 
twenty-four months of the deeming effective date, as suggested in the proposed 
rule).
• Ensure that the e-cigarettes comply with basic harm-reducing requirements, such 
as child-proof packaging, no combustion, no contaminants or unnecessary toxins 
(e.g., within twelve months). 
• Stop taking any action to support or allow the advertising of the e-cigarettes to 
consumers except through direct communications to pre-verified adults who 
confirm that they are current smokers or former smokers who are now regular 
e-cigarette users—other than the listing of the e-cigarette brand name and price 
at retail outlets or in retailer ads (e.g., within 180 days).64 
• Comply with the various requirements and restrictions in the Tobacco Control Act 
and related rules that apply to all newly deemed tobacco products (e.g., registration 
and reporting, no free samples, no false or misleading labeling or advertising).65 
• Submit to FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products (e.g., within 90 days) a signed 
document agreeing to take the above actions before the related deadlines.
To keep things simple and more manageable in this enforcement discretion context, 
FDA could omit using any additional enforcement discretion factors relating to any of 
the other restrictions or requirements of the proposed regulatory scheme for e-cigarettes. 
But the agency could still try to constrain the most egregious claims for e-cigarettes 
allowed to remain on the market by notifying the e-cigarette companies that it intends to 
exercise its enforcement discretion immediately to begin enforcement actions to remove 
from the market any e-cigarettes found to be making any therapeutic claims without the 
required prior drug or device approval orders from FDA or found to have any false or 
misleading labeling or advertising.66 Given the goal of encouraging smokers to switch 
62 Id. at 23,175.
63 Deeming Rule, supra note 9, at 23,176–77.
64 The ads could be allowed to be delivered to all regular e-cigarette users (not just those who are 
former smokers) but that could shift the focus away from the primary purpose for allowing e-cigarette sales 
(to prompt switching from smoking to only e-cigarette use) and allowing e-cigarette advertising to never-
smoker regular e-cigarette users would not, at this point, likely work to prevent them from moving on to 
smoking because the ads would not yet be required to include the anti-smoking supplementary messaging.
65 Deeming Rule, supra note 9, at 23,143.
66 For example, the labels of many e-cigarettes sold in the United States currently include inaccurate 
listings of the products’ nicotine content. See, e.g., Analysis of Nicotine Content of E-Liquid Samples, Salt 
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to less-harmful e-cigarette use, however, FDA could also exercise its discretion not to 
take any enforcement action against any e-cigarettes, because they were being marketed 
with reduced-risk or reduced-exposure claims without a prior permissive order from 
agency (so long as they met all the enforcement discretion factors outlined above). 
Because FDA would be exercising discretion only in respect to manufacturers or 
importers, it would not make sense to have that discretion depend in part on how retailers 
were choosing, independently, to advertise the e-cigarettes. But most brick-and-mortar 
retailer advertising of tobacco products is directly and substantially supported, if not 
entirely paid for, by tobacco product manufacturers (e.g., by providing posters or 
displays to retailers or paying them to display certain products or advertisements).67 So 
the enforcement discretion criteria could reduce publicly visible advertising at retail 
outlets by requiring manufacturers and importers to agree not to take any action to 
support or allow the advertising of their e-cigarettes at retail outlets (other than the 
posting the names and prices of available brands), except to support advertising that 
would reach only certain pre-verified adults.
This enforcement discretion system would directly reflect and move toward the 
previously proposed regulatory scheme for e-cigarettes, and could be explained and 
supported accordingly. FDA could also independently justify these enforcement 
discretion criteria as temporary stopgap measures necessary to reduce the harms to 
the public health that would likely occur from FDA simply allowing all e-cigarettes 
made illegal by the statute to stay on the market provisionally until their manufacturers 
or importers had a reasonable time to submit substantial equivalence or new product 
applications and the agency then had a chance to consider the applications and issue 
related orders. 
While this kind of agency action through enforcement discretion might seem 
overly ambitious to some readers, agency decisions regarding whether or not to take 
enforcement action, or the criteria it used to make those decisions, is rarely subject to 
judicial review. For example, in one of the major Supreme Court rulings on enforcement 
discretion, the Court refused to review FDA’s decision not to take enforcement action, 
stating that it had “recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s 
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a 
decision generally committed to an agency’s complete discretion.”68 In another case 
following that ruling, the D.C. Circuit stated that “FDA enjoys complete discretion not to 
employ the enforcement provisions of the FDC Act, and those decisions are not subject 
to judicial review. As this court recently concluded, the provisions [of the FDC Act] 
authorize, but do not compel the FDA to undertake enforcement activity; they ‘commit 
complete discretion to the [FDA] to decide how and when they should be exercised.’”69 
Two major exceptions apply. Courts will review an agency’s enforcement decisions: 
(1) if Congress has stated in the applicable law how it wants that discretion to be 
exercised (which is not the situation here with the Tobacco Control Act’s provisions); 
or (2) when an agency, through a rule making or some other formal process, publicly 
establishes restrictive criteria that it will be using to make enforcement decisions, thereby 
lake County HealtH department (Dec. 2014), http://ow.ly/i/8bZHm/original (finding actual nicotine content 
ranging from 88% to 840% more than stated amount). 
67 See, e.g., E. C. Feighery et al., How Tobacco Companies Ensure Prime Placement of Their Advertising 
and Products in Stores: Interviews with Retailers About Tobacco Company Incentive Programmes, 12 tobaCCo 
Control, 184, 184–88 (2003).
68 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
69 Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Schering Corp. v. 
Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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reducing the scope of its enforcement discretion.70 In that latter situation, the courts can 
review the agency’s exercise of its enforcement discretion against specific entities to 
make sure it follows that agency-established criteria. 
Accordingly, FDA should be very careful that it does not impede its ability to 
implement the enforcement discretion strategy proposed here, or its ability to otherwise 
exercise its enforcement discretion, by establishing any restrictive criteria for exercising 
its enforcement discretion against those newly deemed tobacco products that are on the 
market illegally as of the effective date of the final deeming rule. For example, FDA 
could preserve its flexibility by announcing the enforcement discretion criteria proposed 
here as only internal guidelines or a policy statement, not as formal restrictions or as 
requirements established in a final rule that the agency would be obligated to follow 
unless or until it formally changed the statements in a subsequent rulemaking.71
The type of enforcement discretion suggested here follows along the line of FDA’s 
action levels for contaminants in foods, where all foods with any amount of the 
contaminants are violating the applicable standard but the agency announces that it 
intends to enforce against only those with levels above an announced “action level.” 
The Supreme Court has upheld the agency’s implementation and use of such informal 
action levels through its enforcement discretion, without any related rulemaking or 
other notice and comment process.72 The courts have also found that action levels 
implemented through enforcement discretion are not subject to judicial review (unless 
the agency begins treating them as substantive rules).73 
Here, the fact that FDA would be exercising its enforcement discretion based not only 
on observable characteristics of the e-cigarettes and their marketing but also on whether 
the manufacturer or importer of the e-cigarettes submitted a formal pledge that it would 
take certain actions by certain deadlines is also permissible. For example, in a somewhat 
parallel situation, the D.C. Circuit found that the Environmental Protection Agency 
could exercise its enforcement discretion, without triggering judicial review, by deciding 
not to take enforcement action against violators that entered into an agreement with 
the agency requiring them to take various actions related to coming into compliance.74 
Consistent with these cases, FDA could implement the proposed enforcement 
discretion process simply by announcing the criteria it plans to consider in deciding 
which e-cigarettes illegally on the market it will enforce against. But it would provide 
70 See, e.g., Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 852 F.2d 9, 
16 (1st Cir. 1988) (“‘Just as Congress can provide the basis for judicial review of nonenforcement decisions 
by spelling out statutory factors to be measured by the courts, so an agency can provide such factors by 
regulation. When an agency chooses to so fetter its discretion, the presumption against reviewability recognized 
in Chaney must give way.’” (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1988))).
71 See, e.g., Farrell v. Dep’t of Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590–91 (2002) (“The general consensus is that 
an agency statement, not issued as a formal regulation, binds the agency only if the agency intended the 
statement to be binding.” (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 
363, 373–74, 377–82 (1957))).
72 Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986); see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 
F.3d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An agency action that merely explains how the agency will enforce a statute 
or regulation—in other words, how it will exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permitting discretion 
under some extant statute or rule—is a general statement of policy,” and general statements of policy do not 
require notice and comment for implementation (and are not subject to pre-enforcement judicial review)).
73 Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d at 949.
74 Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007) While FDA lost a recent case 
relating to enforcement discretion, its holding does not apply to the analysis provided here, much less contradict 
it. Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (FDA’s attempted exercise of enforcement discretion to not 
sample or examine and to allow importation of apparently misbranded, unapproved drugs for lethal injections 
was found subject to judicial review and the failure to act was found not to be a matter of agency discretion 
because the relevant law “sets forth precisely” what FDA must do in the situation at issue). 
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better guidance to the industry regarding their subsequent applications for new product 
orders, and put the agency in a stronger position if there were any judicial review, if 
FDA also showed that, based on a careful consideration of relevant available evidence, 
it had determined that the enforcement discretion criteria met the core standard in the 
Tobacco Control Act for FDA tobacco product regulation by being “appropriate for the 
protection of the public health” (which could basically parallel the analysis provided 
earlier in this paper).75 Such transparency, and asking for public input, could also help 
to protect against possible political or media attacks, while also providing FDA with 
additional information it could use to refine its enforcement discretion approach and 
inform its subsequent consideration of new product orders. 
Whether FDA announced and explained the enforcement discretion criteria in the final 
deeming rule or through some other means, as soon as the agency had active jurisdiction 
over non-drug e-cigarettes it could begin proceedings to stop the marketing and sale of 
any such e-cigarettes that failed to meet the different criteria by the announced deadlines 
or that had obviously false or misleading claims in their advertising or labeling. If it had 
not already done so, FDA could also concurrently take action to stop the marketing and 
sale of any e-cigarettes that were not tobacco products but unapproved drugs or devices. 
Otherwise, manufacturers and importers could escape having to follow the proposed 
enforcement discretion criteria or comply with any FDA tobacco product requirements 
simply by making therapeutic claims for their e-cigarettes, which would convert them 
into unapproved (and unenforced against) drugs or medical devices.
With that loophole closed, FDA’s exercise of its enforcement discretion as described 
would go a long way toward implementing the proposed regulatory approach for 
cigarettes, and that approach could be more fully implemented as a natural result of 
FDA’s subsequent statutorily required review of the substantial equivalence and new 
product applications submitted for e-cigarettes by their manufacturers and importers. 
B.  FDA’s New Product Review Process  
As outlined above, after the final deeming rule puts e-cigarettes under FDA’s active 
tobacco product jurisdiction it is likely that no e-cigarettes could become a legal tobacco 
product without first obtaining a new product or substantial equivalence order from 
FDA. It is improbable, however, that any e-cigarettes would be able to qualify for a 
substantial equivalence order, which requires a finding by FDA that the e-cigarettes 
are “substantially equivalent” to e-cigarettes that were commercially marketed in the 
United States on February 15, 2007. Even if an application were able to establish that 
an e-cigarette had actually been commercially marketed in the United States on that 
date, and could provide sufficient information about its characteristics, those e-cigarettes 
from early 2007 would likely be quite primitive and different from today’s e-cigarettes, 
making any substantial equivalence finding impossible.76 
75 See, e.g., Tobacco Control Act § 910(c), 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c) (2012).
76 Tobacco Control Act §§ 910, 905(j), 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j, 387e(j) (2012). Even if a manufacturer or 
importer of a modern day e-cigarette could show that it was quite similar to an e-cigarette on the market 
on February 15, 2007, to obtain an SE order from FDA and become a legal e-cigarette, the manufacturer or 
importer would also have to show that the differences between its e-cigarette and the one on the market in 
2007 do not “raise different questions of public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j. Exactly what that phrase means 
has not yet been established, but it likely requires, at a minimum, that FDA not issue a substantial equivalence 
order to any e-cigarette that has any different characteristics compared to an e-cigarette found to be on the 
market on February 15, 2007 that might make it more harmful or risky to the public health than the 2007 
version, such as having different kid-attracting flavors, being otherwise more attractive to youth or other 
potential users, or delivering different levels of nicotine or other ingredients or constituents. 
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To become legal tobacco products through the remaining new product order pathway, 
the applications would have to provide sufficient evidence and analysis to enable 
FDA to determine that allowing the e-cigarettes on the market would be “appropriate 
for the protection of the public health.”77 Relevant to this determination, the statute 
requires the agency to consider related health risks and benefits not only to users but 
to the population as a whole, including nonusers, taking into account the likely effect 
of the product’s marketing on whether existing tobacco product users will quit or 
whether current nonusers will start using tobacco products.78 In addition, the statute 
specifically authorizes FDA to include restrictions on the sale and distribution of the 
product, including its advertising, as a condition of issuing a permissive order (e.g., if 
the restrictions are necessary to make allowing the product on the market “appropriate 
for the protection of the public health”).79
As previously discussed, there does not appear to be any public health justification 
for allowing e-cigarettes on the market as tobacco products unless they will be used 
by adequate number of smokers as a less-harmful way to consume nicotine, either 
indefinitely or prior to quitting all tobacco and nicotine use.80 That means it would not 
be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” for FDA to issue a new product 
order that allowed any e-cigarettes to be marketed legally in the United States as a 
tobacco product unless doing so would promote that harm-reduction purpose. That 
suggests that FDA could not issue a new product order for any e-cigarettes that have 
not taken advantage of readily available measures, such as those described previously, 
to minimize the risk of harm to users and exposed nonusers. It also suggests that any 
order allowing an e-cigarette onto the U.S. market must include the kinds of previously 
described advertising restrictions and requirements to minimize the risks of increased 
initiation, reduced cessation, or harmful, long-term dual use, and increase the likelihood 
of constructive switching by smokers.  
Following this analysis, FDA could further establish the regulatory scheme proposed 
here simply by considering each of the e-cigarette new product applications on a case-
by-case basis and issuing a related order that either denies the application (making 
the e-cigarettes subject to being pulled from the market) or allows the e-cigarettes 
to stay on the market (subject to any advertising restrictions necessary to make that 
“appropriate for the protection of the public health”). No related rule or guidance would 
be required. However, to be more transparent, FDA could announce publicly or through 
communications to the industry that, based on its analysis of existing facts and evidence 
(paralleling the analysis provided here), the agency believes that it would be able to 
review e-cigarette new product applications more quickly and be more likely to issue 
orders allowing them on the market legally if the applicants:
• Proposed to market the e-cigarettes only as a harm-reduction product for smokers, 
and submitted related applications for both new product and a modified risk 
tobacco product orders.81
77 Tobacco Control Act § 910(c), 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c) (2012). 
78 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(4).
79 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(1)(B). On “sale and distribution” including advertising, the statute also explicitly 
gives FDA the authority to restrict and regulate advertising to the “full extent permitted by the first amendment 
to the constitution.” See 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(1). 
80 A new product order application for e-cigarettes could not be supported by evidence showing that it 
would serve as an effective cessation aid because that would make it a drug, requiring a separate FDA new 
drug approval.
81 If they did not make modified risk claims, the e-cigarette advertising directed to current adult smokers 
would not be as effective at prompting constructive switching solely to e-cigarette use (and would not be as 
appropriate for the protection of the public health), and such claims would make the e-cigarettes into modified 
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• Proposed to advertise the e-cigarettes with an accurate reduced-risk claim to 
encourage smokers to switch completely to using the e-cigarettes, instead (and 
FDA could provide model language).
• Proposed to advertise the e-cigarette to consumers only through direct 
communications to pre-verified adults who confirm that they are current smokers 
or regular e-cigarette users who are former smokers, without taking any action to 
promote or allow their advertising to consumers in any other way by retailers or 
other third parties—except for the posting of the e-cigarette brand name and price 
at retail outlets and in retail outlet advertising.82 
• Proposed to include in those direct communications supplementary messaging 
regarding the greater health benefits from quitting all tobacco and nicotine use, 
the harmfulness of e-cigarette use, the e-cigarettes’ viability as a harm-reduction 
product only if used exclusively instead of smoking; and the possible extra harms 
from dual use; and identifying sources of cessation assistance (and FDA could 
provide model text for applicants to adapt or use).
• Proposed that any communications concerning the e-cigarettes made to doctors 
or other health professionals would be for the sole purpose of educating them 
about the potential health benefits their smoker patients who would not otherwise 
quit could secure from switching completely to using e-cigarettes, with any such 
communications in written form including supplementary messaging similar to 
that sent in the communications to adult smokers.83 
• Provided evidence establishing that the e-cigarettes complied with basic 
requirements to reduce their potential harmfulness (e.g., no combustion or risk 
of combustion, child-proof packaging, no contaminants or unnecessary toxins). 
Concurrently, FDA could state that e-cigarette manufacturers and importers would 
remain free to submit applications to try to obtain substantial equivalence, new product 
or modified risk tobacco product orders, pursuant to the procedures and requirements 
set forth in the Tobacco Control Act, without meeting all or any of the other criteria 
identified by the agency as being likely to expedite review or increase the chances of a 
positive order.84 All FDA would be saying is that it believes that it would likely be easier 
and faster for the agency to follow the statute’s requirements and issue a permissive order 
pursuant to applications for e-cigarettes that met all the listed criteria, given the core 
facts that are already known about e-cigarette health harms and risks and the potential 
impact of their advertising on initiation, cessation, switching, dual use and relapse. 
For example, FDA might point out that it would likely be impossible for the agency 
to find that it would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” to allow any 
risk tobacco products, requiring a modified risk tobacco product order. Even without any explicit or implied 
modified risk claims in the ads, themselves, it is possible that the required supplementary messaging, despite 
coming from the government, would make the e-cigarettes into modified risk tobacco products that require 
an MRTP order. Pursuant to the Tobacco Control Act, manufacturers and importers may submit a single 
application to obtain both a new product order and a modified risk tobacco product order at the same time. 
21 U.S.C. § 387k(1)(4). 
82 As discussed above, FDA might also allow direct advertising to never-smoking regular e-cigarette 
users in order to discourage them from converting into smokers.
83 FDA might also state that applications proposing to communicate responsibly with doctors and 
other medical professionals regarding the possible benefits of recommending e-cigarette use to their smoker 
patients would not be restricted might also make it easier to find allowing the e-cigarettes on the market 
“appropriate for the protection of the public health” (because it would increase the likelihood that it would 
increase constructive switching from smoking)—or FDA could at least state that it did not think that prohibiting 
such communications would benefit the public health.
84 21 U.S.C. § 387j (for new product and substantial equivalence orders); 21 U.S.C. § 387e(j) (for 
substantial equivalence orders); 21 U.S.C. § 387k (for modified risk tobacco product orders).
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e-cigarette on the market if it were more harmful to users or non-users than necessary, 
especially if its manufacturer had failed to take advantage of readily available ways to 
reduce their potential harmfulness, such as those outlined above. But the agency would 
also leave the door open to allow an applicant to show that its e-cigarettes were already 
as harmless as they could be without meeting some or all of those criteria.
Similarly, FDA could explain that it is difficult to imagine how allowing a manufacturer 
or importer to publicly advertise its e-cigarettes would not create unnecessary and much 
larger risks of increased youth or non-smoker initiation, as compared to allowing only 
more direct and less public advertising only to pre-verified adult smokers. But FDA 
would also leave the door open for an applicant to provide evidence that established that 
fewer or different advertising restrictions or other measures would work as well or better 
to reduce youth exposure or to prevent increased initiation. Less likely, an applicant 
could obtain a permissive order by providing sufficient evidence to establish that there 
would be no public health benefit from reducing exposure to e-cigarette advertising 
among youth or adult non-smokers, either because that advertising would not increase 
initiation into e-cigarette (or other tobacco product) use or because the e-cigarettes at 
issue posed no risk of causing any health harms to any users or non-users or of serving 
as a gateway to the use of more harmful tobacco products85 
Developing and providing adequate, credible evidence to establish that any of these 
alternatives to meeting the proposed application criteria would make allowing the 
subject e-cigarettes on the market equally or more “appropriate for the public health” 
would likely be very difficult, and more costly and time consuming to the applicant. 
Having to evaluate that evidence would also make FDA’s application review more 
complicated and time consuming than evaluating applications adopting the suggested 
application criteria. But these comparisons simply provide additional justification for 
FDA announcing that it believes it would be able to provide more rapid consideration 
and be more likely to be able to issue favorable orders for those applicants that chose 
to follow the presented criteria.86
At the same time, FDA could refine and improve those application criteria, and 
develop even stronger supporting evidence, through using the considerable new 
information that would become available during the enforcement discretion stage. 
If the enforcement discretion stage produced, as intended, a U.S. e-cigarette market 
dominated by manufacturers and importers complying with the enforcement discretion 
criteria, the related changes to youth and non-smoker e-cigarette initiation and smoker 
quit rates would inform FDA as to whether, and to what extent, it needed to require more 
comprehensive restrictions and requirements in the new product orders to better protect 
the public health. For example, if initiation among youth and nonsmokers dropped to 
trivial levels during the enforcement discretion stage, the agency might determine that 
there would be no likely public health benefit from using new product orders to impose 
85 FDA might also acknowledge a more complicated possibility: that an applicant might provide evidence 
adequate to establish that allowing more public e-cigarette advertising would work more effectively to promote 
complete switching to e-cigarettes among smokers, with the related public health gains being somewhat larger 
than any possible public health losses from the less restricted advertising increasing e-cigarette initiation 
among youth and non-smokers. But that raises some difficult ethical issues, beyond the reach of this paper, 
regarding whether FDA, in determining what is “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” may (or 
must) value preventing new health harms from new initiation among youth or among adults who would not 
otherwise use any tobacco products equally or more highly than reducing harms among existing smokers. 
86 Because expressing this belief would not be a final agency decision or action, it could not be 
challenged in court. In any case, courts typically give considerable deference to agencies regarding good-
faith, evidence-based determinations, especially in their areas of expertise. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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any restrictions or requirements that went beyond the criteria used in the enforcement 
discretion stage (e.g., by prohibiting certain flavored e-cigarettes or implementing 
additional advertising restrictions or requirements). 
Conversely, if there were considerable e-cigarette use among youth and never-
smoking adults after the enforcement discretion stage’s full implementation, that would 
provide even more support for establishing related restrictions and requirements in the 
new product and modified tobacco product orders for e-cigarettes, such as requiring the 
factual disclosure messaging in the direct advertising to current smokers and e-cigarette 
users and prohibiting manufacturers from taking any action to support or permit retailer 
or other third party advertising other than through the kinds of advertising the orders 
permitted the manufacturers and importers to do themselves.87  
C.  FDA’s Drug and Device Regulation of E-cigarettes
If FDA took all of these actions on the tobacco product side, all that might be needed 
on the drug side would be much more active enforcement against any e-cigarettes that 
qualified as unapproved drugs or devices, and were, therefore, free from having to 
comply with any requirements or restrictions placed on e-cigarette tobacco products. 
In some cases, it might be difficult to determine whether the e-cigarette claim was 
therapeutic (which would make it an illegal drug) or just a non-therapeutic reduced-harm 
or other health-related claim (which would not remove the e-cigarette from the tobacco 
product category). But the relevance of any such gray area would largely disappear if, 
during the enforcement discretion stage, FDA actively enforced against any e-cigarettes 
that were not meeting the enforcement discretion criteria—which would either be 
illegal tobacco products or illegal unapproved drugs. For example, if FDA moved to 
seize e-cigarettes for being illegally on the market as unapproved drugs because of an 
apparent therapeutic claim, and the manufacturer tried to block that enforcement by 
arguing that the e-cigarettes were actually tobacco products because the claim was not 
therapeutic, then the agency could simply seize the e-cigarettes as tobacco products that 
were illegally on the market without the required new product or substantial equivalence 
order (and likely without a required modified risk tobacco product order, as well). To 
speed things up, the initial warning letter sent to the manufacturer could state that the 
e-cigarette was illegally on the market because it was either an unapproved drug or a 
tobacco product without one or more required pre-market orders. 
The more complex questions regarding how to regulate e-cigarettes that are 
approved drugs or devices will not arise until FDA issues an order approving some 
e-cigarettes as drugs or devices, and that is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Developing 
an application for such an order is complicated and time consuming, and the strict 
statutory requirements for qualifying as an approved drug that is “safe and effective” for 
its intended therapeutic use and the agency’s related procedures and practices suggests 
that no e-cigarette is likely to enter the U.S. market as an approved drug or device for 
years to come.88 If the only major additional benefit from qualifying an e-cigarette as 
87 If e-cigarette use among youth and never-smoking adults were at troubling levels after the order-
issuing stage with these new requirements were well underway, and there were still highly visible retailer 
e-cigarette advertising, that would support also fully implementing all of the previously described retailer-
directed requirements and restrictions. Implementing those additional restrictions directly on retailers (e.g., 
not allowing e-cigarette sales except to adults who confirmed they were smokers or e-cigarette using former 
smokers) would likely require a new rulemaking. But issuing the new rule would be much easier because of 
the evidence developed during the enforcement discretion and order-issuing stages showing that such new 
restrictions on retailer marketing were necessary to protect and promote the public health.
88 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). Arthur A.Ciociola et al., How Drugs are Developed and Approved by the 
FDA: Current Process and Future Directions, 109 am. J. gastroenterology 620, 620–23 (2014); Leonard V. 
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an approved drug instead of as a legally marketable tobacco product were receiving 
legal authority to make cessation claims or other therapeutic claims (instead of only 
reduced-risk or harm-reduction claims), it is also possible that very few manufacturers 
and importers would ever try—especially if it became clear that they could qualify for 
legal marketing more quickly, easily and cheaply through the regulatory scheme for 
e-cigarette tobacco products proposed here.
The incentives to qualify as an approved drug would, however, be much stronger if 
e-cigarette drugs would be subject to far fewer advertising or other marketing restrictions 
than e-cigarette tobacco products (e.g., could be advertised on TV or sold as an over-
the-counter drug with no age restrictions). Accordingly, to complement and support the 
tobacco-side regulation of e-cigarettes proposed here, FDA would, ideally, announce 
not only that it would work aggressively to pull any e-cigarettes off the market that 
appear to be unapproved drugs but also that it intends to subject any e-cigarettes that 
qualify as approved drugs to sales, advertising and other marketing restrictions that at 
least parallel those applied to e-cigarettes that are tobacco products.89
If FDA were confident that it could create such a parallel system of advertising and 
other marketing restrictions for e-cigarettes approved as drugs, it might make sense 
for the agency to issue a rule to create a related expedited pathway for e-cigarettes that 
meet certain pre-established criteria to obtain drug approvals for cessation-assistance 
purposes. Any subsequent e-cigarette cessation drug approvals, with parallel marketing 
restrictions, should help to increase quitting by smokers, not just by allowing cessation 
claims in the manufacturers’ direct advertising to the smokers but also by providing 
doctors and other medical personnel with an FDA-approved e-cigarette cessation aid 
that they could recommend to their patients who smoke to help them quit smoking or 
all tobacco and nicotine use. To promote those kinds of recommendations by doctors 
and other medical professionals (and reduce possible First Amendment challenges), 
FDA could also allow manufacturers and importers that qualify their e-cigarettes as 
approved cessation aids to advertise those e-cigarettes directly to doctors and other 
medical personnel as suitable for prescribing or recommending to their smoking patients 
for cessation purposes.
V. woULD thIS reGULAtory ApproAch to e-cIGArette 
ADVertISInG be conStItUtIonAL?
Congress has the authority to ban all e-cigarettes and FDA could effectively ban all 
e-cigarettes that are drugs (by finding that none could be “safe and effective” for any 
therapeutic purposes) and ban all e-cigarettes that are tobacco products (by finding 
that doing so would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health”). But the 
“power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the 
power to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct.”90 That means that FDA could 
still face considerable First Amendment challenges if it tried to impose the advertising 
restrictions in the regulatory scheme proposed here on e-cigarettes that were already 
being legally marketed and sold as tobacco products. But the actual situation with 
e-cigarettes is quite different because they will already be illegal products, through the 
terms of the Tobacco Control Act, as of the effective date of the final deeming rule. As 
Sacks et al., Scientific and Regulatory Reasons for Delay and Denial of FDA Approval of Initial Applications 
for New Drugs, 2000–2012, 311 JAMA 378, 378–84 (2014).
89 The main obstacle to FDA establishing such parallel advertising restrictions for approved e-cigarette 
drugs would be the First Amendment, which is considered in the next section of this paper.
90 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999).
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proposed here, FDA would not be imposing advertising restrictions or requirements on 
legally marketed e-cigarettes. Instead, it would, first, simply be exercising enforcement 
discretion to focus its enforcement efforts on those illegal e-cigarettes that threaten to 
cause the most public health harm and then, second, allowing e-cigarettes onto the U.S. 
market as legal tobacco products pursuant to the procedures and requirements already 
established by the Tobacco Control Act, and only for the purpose of offering smokers 
a less harmful way to consume nicotine. Accordingly, the First Amendment challenges 
faced by the agency should be significantly reduced. 
As the Supreme Court has stated, “so long as the sale and use of tobacco is lawful 
for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating information 
about its products and adult customers have an interest in receiving that information.”91 
That conclusion directly supports its inverse, that the manufacturers, importers, and adult 
consumers of e-cigarettes made unlawful by the deeming rule no longer have any such 
protected interests. As the underlying first prong of the four-part Central Hudson test for 
whether government restrictions on commercial speech are constitutionally permissible 
states, there are no First Amendment protections for commercial speech “related to 
unlawful activity”92—and advertising to promote the sale of illegal e-cigarettes relates 
to unlawful activity. That means First Amendment constraints should not apply at all 
during the enforcement discretion stage, when the e-cigarettes would be illegal tobacco 
products, even if they were otherwise complying with the Tobacco Control Act or being 
sold in accordance with FDA’s announced enforcement discretion criteria. 
First Amendment protections also should not apply, later, to any advertising 
restrictions included in new product or modified risk tobacco product orders for 
e-cigarettes if they were voluntarily proposed by applicants and not required by 
FDA. Although those advertising restrictions would apply to legal tobacco products, 
they would be self-imposed by the applicant. Accordingly, the restriction, while in a 
government order, might not be seen as a restriction imposed by the government or 
through government action.93 But even if including advertising restrictions in the orders, 
as proposed by the applicant, were found to be government action, potentially making 
the orders subject to First Amendment review, the applicant’s voluntary proposal or 
consent to the restrictions should constitute a legally valid waiver of its related First 
Amendment rights because FDA neither required or compelled the applicant to include 
them in its application or consent to them being in any subsequent order.94 Either way, 
First Amendment review should not apply. 
91 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001).
92 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
93 See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973) (stating the 
First Amendment “is a restraint on government action, not that of private persons”). But there do not appear 
to be any federal court rulings on whether a government order including a speech constraint at the request of 
an applicant constitutes a constraint imposed by government action. In a different context, First Amendment 
challenges to speech-restrictive provisions in private agreements or contracts, courts have found that “judicial 
enforcement of terms that could not be enacted by the government has not ordinarily been considered state 
action.” Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican 
Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2012)). But state action (violating the Equal Protection Clause) 
has been found when the courts enforce private agreements that discriminate against one of the parties. Id. 
But discrimination would not be an issue in FDA orders.
94 See, e.g., Henley v. Cuyahoga County Board, 141 F. App’x 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[C]onstitutional 
rights, like rights and privileges of lesser importance, may be contractually waived where the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the party foregoing its rights has done so of its own 
volition, with full understanding of the consequences of its waiver” (quoting Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City 
of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
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In addition, applicants would remain free to apply, instead, for an order with fewer 
or no advertising restrictions, and FDA would give any such applications full and fair 
consideration under the terms of the Tobacco Control Act. Consequently, this situation 
would not be an example of the government wrongfully making the granting of a 
government benefit contingent on the applicant giving up constitutional rights (the 
so-called “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine).95 
It might be argued that FDA was offering a government benefit (expedited review) to 
applicants that give up their First Amendment rights (by proposing certain advertising 
restrictions described by the agency). But that should not trigger constitutional review 
so long as FDA was neither requiring applicants to give up any First Amendment 
rights to obtain a permissive order nor promising expedited treatment and a favorable 
order for those did. The agency would simply be telling the industry that, based on its 
analysis of available information regarding e-cigarettes and tobacco product marketing, 
it currently believes that it will likely be able to consider new product and modified risk 
tobacco product applications that propose such advertising restrictions more quickly 
and be more likely to approve them. In particular, FDA would be explaining that, absent 
such advertising restrictions, it would take considerable amounts of new evidence and 
analysis (beyond what it currently available publicly or to the agency) to establish that 
the marketing of any e-cigarettes would not threaten to increase initiation among youth 
and current non-smokers to such an extent as to make the product “inappropriate for the 
protection of the public health.” In that context, if a manufacturer voluntarily decided 
to propose the suggested advertising restrictions in its application for a new product 
order (instead of taking advantage of the opportunity to provide evidence supporting 
fewer restrictions), there does not appear to be any basis for the applicant to challenge 
the inclusion of those advertising restrictions in any subsequent order as violating its 
First Amendment rights.
First Amendment review could apply, however, to any advertising restrictions 
that FDA included in a new product or modified risk tobacco product order that the 
applicant had not proposed or voluntarily adopted during the application process. 
But advertising constraints imposed in response to a manufacturer’s application as 
a necessary requirement to enable FDA to find, as required by the Tobacco Control 
Act, that allowing the e-cigarettes onto the market as newly legal products would be 
“appropriate for the protection of the public health” should more easily survive First 
Amendment scrutiny than advertising restrictions that FDA might impose on its own 
initiative through a rule on all e-cigarettes after they were already on the market legally 
and already legally engaging in the commercial speech that would be restricted. It is, for 
example, possible that the different status of the products and their advertising at the time 
the restrictions are implemented might make it easier to impose them constitutionally 
through a new product order than a rule. But, as described below, the main reason that 
establishing the restrictions constitutionally might be easier through new product orders 
is because of practical consequences arising from the application and order procedures. 
In this regard, the Sixth Circuit has already found that these kinds of procedures are 
constitutional and otherwise permissible, in its ruling upholding the Tobacco Control 
Act’s modified risk tobacco product provisions—which require prior orders from 
95 See, e.g., KT & G Corp. v. Oklahoma, 535 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The government ‘may 
not deny a benefit to a person on the basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, 
his interest in freedom of speech.’” (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))). This is true 
even if the person has no entitlement to the benefit and even though the government can deny the benefit 
for a number of other reasons. See id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 
(2003).
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FDA finding that tobacco products making reduced-harm or reduced-exposure claims 
will actually benefit users and the overall public health before they may be marketed 
legally (and also authorize the agency to impose restrictions on the advertising of those 
products as necessary to make permitting their marketing appropriate for the protection 
of the public health).96 
That holding applied the so-called four-part Central Hudson test established by 
the Supreme Court. That test is regularly used to evaluate whether restrictions on 
commercial speech are constitutional, and it would apply to any First Amendment 
challenges to FDA new product orders.97 To date, cases applying the Central Hudson 
test to restrictions on tobacco product advertising typically assume that the advertising 
qualifies for constitutional protections under the first-prong of the text, which requires 
that the commercial speech not be “more likely to deceive the public than inform 
it” and not be “related to illegal activity” in order to qualify for First Amendment 
protections.98 But reasonable arguments can be made that the publicly viewable forms 
of e-cigarette advertising subject to the proposed restrictions do not actually qualify 
for First Amendment protections. 
For example, if the proposed advertising restrictions were challenged, the government 
could offer evidence and analysis showing that the effected advertising is “more likely 
to deceive the public than inform it” because of the products’ inherent addictiveness 
and harmfulness and the ads inability to disclose that in an understandable, not 
misleading way; or because simply seeing such publicly visible advertising makes some 
consumers believe, mistakenly, that the products are appropriate or even safe for use by 
any consumers (e.g., because the government is not restricting the advertisements).99 
Specifically in regard to e-cigarettes, for example, research has found that higher 
exposure to e-cigarette ads make young adults more likely to be ignorant or have 
incorrect views about e-cigarettes containing nicotine.100 There is also evidence that 
the use of different colors and descriptors in the labeling and advertising of cigarettes 
makes significant numbers of consumers inaccurately believe that some brands or sub-
brands are less harmful than others.101 In addition, the government could also reference 
96 Tobacco Control Act § 911, 21 U.S.C. § 387k (2009); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United 
States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2011). 
97 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. (Central Hudson), 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within 
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.” (emphasis added)); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 
(2001) (the most recent case where the Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test to restrictions on 
tobacco product advertising).
98 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64.
99 See, e.g., Andrew A. Strasser et al., PREP Advertisement Features Affect Smokers’ Beliefs Regarding 
Potential Harm, 17 tobaCCo Control i32 (2008). More evidence could be developed relatively quickly 
to provide additional support through surveys, focus groups, and more sophisticated studies of consumer 
reactions to different samples of the advertising and of their reported related beliefs. 
100 Ashley Sanders-Jackson et al., Knowledge About E-cigarette Constituents and Regulation: Results 
From a National Survey of U.S. Young Adults, 17 niCotine & tobaCCo res. (forthcoming 2015), available 
at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/01/24/ntr.ntu276 (advance copy published online ahead 
of print).
101 See, e.g., Israel T.Agaku et al., Cigarette Design and Marketing Features are Associated with 
Increased Smoking Susceptibility and Perception of Reduced Harm Among Smokers in 27 E.U. Countries, 24 
tobaCCo Control (forthcoming 2015), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/10/21/
tobaccocontrol-2014-051922.abstract (advance copy published online ahead of print); Ron Borland & Steven 
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the long history of misleading and manipulative advertising by the tobacco industry, 
often in subtle or subliminal ways, and the evidence showing that e-cigarettes are using 
parallel advertising strategies.102 
The government could also assert that the restricted advertising directly relates to 
illegal activity because it would be encouraging e-cigarette use among youth, and sales to 
youth would be federally prohibited and purchases and possession by youth are illegal in 
a growing number of states.103 The restricted ads could also be seen as concerning illegal 
activity if FDA order allowing the e-cigarettes on the market permitted their sale only 
to current or former smokers and the ads encouraged their use by other adults, as well. 
A counter-argument is that even if most, or all, of the e-cigarette ads at issue mislead 
consumers or concern unlawful activity, and future e-cigarette ads are likely to do 
the same, future e-cigarette ads could be structured and delivered in ways that do not 
mislead consumers or concern illegal activity, thereby qualifying for First Amendment 
protections. To accommodate this possibility, any rule or order establishing the proposed 
advertising restrictions could also include a mechanism that would exempt any specific 
ads that were not misleading and did not concern illegal activity. For example, FDA 
could establish a process whereby it would exempt specific ads from having to comply 
with the restrictions if the seller provided evidence showing that the ads would not 
mislead consumers or increase youth initiation and would not have any other impacts 
that would make allowing the e-cigarettes to stay on the market inappropriate for the 
protection of the public health.104 
Even if the court did not agree with these arguments that the advertising subject to 
the restrictions did not qualify under the first prong of the Central Hudson test for First 
Amendment protections, making these argument would still establish a much more 
helpful foundation or context for the court’s analysis of the remaining prongs of the test. 
As the 3rd Circuit recently stated, for example, “[t]he more misleading the advertisement, 
the more constitutional leeway is granted the [government] in restricting it.”105 
Savvas, The Effects of Variant Descriptors on the Potential Effectiveness of Plain Packaging, 23 tobaCCo 
Control 58 (2014). 
102 See, e.g., Press Release from Senators, supra note 30; Duke et al., supra note 30, at 5–6; see also, 
e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States (Discount Tobacco), 674 F.3d 509, 535 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“Evidence in the congressional record demonstrating a pattern of [potentially deceptive] advertisements . . 
. [may be] adequate to establish . . . the likelihood of deception” (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. 
v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010))). The case goes on to describe some of the evidence of the tobacco 
industry’s history of deceptive advertising and concludes that “[t]here is no question that the harm caused 
by the tobacco industry’s use of misleading advertising and marketing tactics regarding the relative risks of 
certain tobacco products is real and significant.” Discount Tobacco, 674 F.2d at 535. While disclaimers might 
be seen as a remedy that the tobacco industry could use to stop their advertising from being misleading, there 
is evidence that disclaimers frequently further confuse or mislead consumers rather than prevent them from 
being misled in the first place. See, e.g., Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of 
Mandatory Disclosures, 31 J. pub. pol’y & marketing 293 (2012); see also Micah L. Berman, Manipulative 
Marketing and the First Amendment, geo. l.J. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2294107. 
103 See, e.g., Kristy Marynak et al., State Laws Prohibiting Sales to Minors and Indoor Use of Electronic 
Nicotine Delivery Systems—United States, November 2014, morbidity & mortality wkly. rep. (Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.), Dec. 12, 2014, at 1145. But see Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 
602 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that ads for age-restricted products primarily intended for underage 
buyers concerns lawful activity, and is therefore protected by the First Amendment, because the ads are also 
intended for adult of-age buyers).
104 Such a mechanism would also help to counter any claims that the restrictions were “more extensive 
than necessary,” under the fourth-prong of the Central Hudson test, which is discussed below.
105 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2014). The court also noted that “[a]dvertising that is 
inherently misleading or has proven to be misleading in practice “may be prohibited entirely.” Id. (quoting 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
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Under the second prong, the government must show that it is implementing the 
restrictions to promote a government interest that is substantial.106 In the Sixth Circuit 
case applying the Central Hudson test to various provisions in the Tobacco Control Act, 
the primary asserted government interest was preventing or reducing youth tobacco 
use, which the Supreme Court has found to be substantial.107 But the government’s 
only asserted interest for the Act’s modified risk tobacco product provisions was to 
prevent fraudulent claims and consumer deception.108 To provide a stronger foundation 
for defending the proposed e-cigarette advertising restrictions in either new product 
or modified risk tobacco product orders, FDA could also assert the government’s 
substantial interest in ensuring that any new tobacco products allowed to be marketed 
in the United States will be “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” and 
also assert the government’s more specific substantial interests in ensuring that the 
e-cigarette advertising: (a) will not increase public health harms; (b) will not increase 
youth initiation into e-cigarette or other tobacco product use; and (c) will help reduce 
the health harms caused by smoked tobacco products.109 
Given what is known about the power of advertising, the proposed advertising 
restrictions, by reducing exposure to cigarette advertising among youth and nonsmokers, 
should also be found to promote these substantial government interests directly, thereby 
satisfying the third-prong of the Central Hudson test.110 In fact, Supreme Court has 
already stated that “we have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates 
demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.”111 
The fourth and final prong of the Central Hudson text requires that the advertising 
restrictions also be “not more extensive than necessary” to advance the asserted 
106 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. (Central Hudson), 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
107 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he State’s interest in preventing underage 
tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling” (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 
(2001))).
108 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 534–35.
109 There should not be any question that these are each legitimate substantial government interests 
for the purposes of First Amendment commercial speech analysis, especially in the context of new product 
orders. See Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 548 (stating that the government can show a substantial interest in 
alleviating the effects of tobacco advertising on juvenile consumers). See generally, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504–05 (1996) (stating that government 
has a substantial interest in “reducing alcohol consumption” or “promoting temperance”); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Company, 514 U.S. 476, 477 (1995) (“The Government has a significant interest in protecting 
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol 
strength, which could lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs.”). In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. 
Circuit stated: “Like the district court, we are skeptical that the government can assert a substantial interest 
in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked 
to adverse health consequences.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). But that statement was dicta and related only to government warning labels asserting that smokers 
should quit, not to non-assertive, non-content restrictions on tobacco product advertising to prevent it from 
discouraging cessation among those who would otherwise quit (or from producing other public health harms). 
110 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
111 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557 (2001) (also noting that the Massachusetts 
Attorney General had cited “numerous studies to support this theory in the case of tobacco products”); see 
also Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 548 (endorsing government evidence that “preventing juveniles from 
viewing tobacco advertising materially impacts their decision to use tobacco”); United States v. Edge Broad. 
Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2707 (1993) (“If there is an immediate connection between advertising and demand, 
and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing demand for 
gambling is correspondingly advanced.”). The Supreme Court has also “permitted litigants to justify speech 
restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, . . . to 
justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’” Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 555 (quoting Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
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substantial government’s interests.112 What, exactly “not more extensive than necessary” 
means appears to have changed over time; but in the most recent Supreme Court 
application of that test it stated that “if the Government could achieve its interests in 
a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government 
must do so.”113 
However interpreted, it should not be difficult to meet this standard. Most 
fundamentally, any less-extensive restrictions would, by definition, work less well 
to reduce exposure to the advertising among youth and among those who would 
suffer health harms from using e-cigarettes. But that would work directly against the 
government’s substantial interest in reducing illegal youth use and the negative public 
health impacts of e-cigarette advertising by minimizing such exposure to that advertising. 
Those less-extensive means would, therefore, not be acceptable or constitutionally 
required alternatives.114  
Accordingly, no viable less-extensive restrictions appear to exist. Nevertheless, to 
satisfy the First Amendment it might still be necessary to establish that the proposed 
advertising restrictions would not “unduly impinge on the [sellers’] ability to propose 
a commercial transaction and the adult [consumers’] opportunity to obtain information 
about products” or on “tobacco retailers and manufacturers . . . interest in conveying 
truthful information about their products to adults, and [the] adults . . . corresponding 
interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco products.”115 In fact, this test 
might apply even more clearly and specifically here, where the public health goals of 
the restrictions would be thwarted if manufacturers and sellers were not able to propose 
that adult smokers and e-cigarette using former smokers buy and use e-cigarettes instead 
of smoking or if those consumers were not able to receive that information.
But the fact that only smokers and e-cigarette users who are former smokers could 
benefit from using e-cigarettes and, more importantly, the e-cigarettes are being allowed 
on the market legally only for those specific consumers’ use, could also narrow the 
scope of the seller and consumer interests that merit First Amendment protection. Given 
the courts well established deference to agency determinations, especially in their 
areas of expertise, the courts should have to accept and follow any bona fide formal 
determination by FDA that the only way it could be “appropriate for the protection 
112 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
113 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002). Previously, the Court has stated that the 
“no more extensive than necessary” test is more permissive than the strict scrutiny “least restrictive means” 
test used in other non-commercial speech contexts, stating that all the former requires is a “reasonable fit” 
between the ends and means chosen to accomplish those ends, “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the 
desired objective.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 556. 
114 Under current case law, there does not appear to be any First Amendment justification for the courts 
to rule that FDA should impose less restrictive advertising constraints if that would cause increased public 
health harms or reduce the amount of secured public health benefits. For example, the Supreme Court has 
not imposed or suggested any test or procedure for balancing or evaluating the size of any secured public 
health gains against the severity of any related commercial speech constraints. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (“[G]overnment laws and regulations may significantly restrict speech, as 
long as they also ‘directly advance’ a ‘substantial’ government interest that could not ‘be served as well by 
a more limited restriction.’” (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added))). Nor could the 
Tobacco Control Act be read to require FDA to impose only the minimum advertising restrictions necessary 
to enable the agency to determine that allowing the e-cigarettes on the market would produce at least some 
net public health gains. The Act gives FDA authority to impose restrictions that will maximize the potential 
public health benefits and minimize the possible health harms and risks from allowing the tobacco product 
on the market. Indeed, failing to require advertising restrictions to minimize the risk of new health harms and 
maximize the likelihood and size of new harm reductions could be seen as “inappropriate for the protection 
of the public health.”
115 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 529, 565.
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of the public health” to issue an order allowing e-cigarettes on the market is to make 
them legally available as a less harmful alternative to smoking only to existing smokers 
and to former smokers who are using e-cigarettes.116 But such a finding (especially if 
used to prohibit sales of e-cigarettes to anyone other than these intended consumers) 
should mean that sellers do not have any First Amendment interest or right to convey 
e-cigarette information to anyone other than those adult smokers or adult e-cigarette 
users who are former smokers. Similarly, the only consumers who should have any 
interest or right to receive or obtain information about the e-cigarettes should be those 
same legal and order-intended consumers. That suggests that the final First Amendment 
question is whether the advertising restrictions unduly impinge on the sellers’ ability to 
communicate relevant commercial information about e-cigarettes to those legal adult 
consumers for whose use the e-cigarettes were allowed on the market.
Because the proposed advertising restrictions are meant to allow the sellers to reach 
and influence these specific consumers (while minimizing exposure among others), 
they should satisfy this last First Amendment hurdle. In fact, through the order-issuing 
stage no direct restrictions or requirements are placed on retailers, and e-cigarette 
manufacturers and importers would be readily able to communicate with their legal 
customers, both directly and indirectly by: (a) delivering e-cigarette advertising, with 
no content restrictions, directly to any pre-verified adults who are among the categories 
of consumers who can secure public health benefits from using e-cigarettes; (b) having 
their e-cigarette brand names, with prices, listed at brick-and-mortar and Internet retail 
outlets that sell them or in any other advertising for such retail outlets;117 and (c) delivering 
educational materials and other advertising to doctors or other medical professionals 
for the purpose of informing them about the possible health benefits to their smoker 
patients from switching to e-cigarettes.118 
These advertising pathways leave sellers adequate direct and indirect means to 
communicate relevant product information to their legal consumers. But some might 
argue that smaller e-cigarette manufacturers typically do not have as extensive lists of 
smoker mailing or email address lists as larger manufacturers, making it more difficult for 
them to do the kind of direct advertising allowed in this proposed system. Thanks to the 
Internet and other technologies (such as commercially available age and ID verification 
software), however, email and mailing lists can be readily developed or purchased 
to allow for related direct emails or regular mailings – and likely cost considerably 
less than some of the prohibited public forms of advertising, such as TV or radio ads, 
billboards, magazine ads, or displays at retail outlets.119 E-cigarette manufacturers and 
importers with more resources would be able to afford more of the permitted advertising 
than those with fewer resources. But that is the way our market system works and is no 
different than the current situation. Moreover, there is nothing in the First Amendment 
or the Tobacco Control Act that prohibits or restricts the ability of FDA to take action 
116 See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light, 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (“[W]
e recognize the relevant agency’s technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is 
without substantial basis in fact.”). 
117 See, e.g., WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 
2009) (holding no violation of the First Amendment by law banning all external retail advertising of on-site 
video lotteries except for uniform signs outside of the premises indicating that the lottery products are available 
there). In reaching its finding, the Court stated that the restrictions struck a balance so that the advertising 
can inform consumers that the products are available but “does not prey on vulnerable populations.” Id. at 
307.
118 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002).
119 See, e.g., Smokers Email Masterfile, supra note 33.
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“appropriate for the protection of the public health” that also makes it more difficult for 
all or some tobacco product firms to compete successfully in the marketplace. 
Using a different tactic, however, manufacturers might argue that the proposed 
advertising restrictions are more restrictive than necessary because they could design 
advertising for their e-cigarettes using one or more of the prohibited public forms of 
advertising so that it would not increase youth or nonsmoker initiation or otherwise 
work to increase public health harms and would work more effectively to prompt more 
adult smokers to switch entirely to e-cigarettes. But if they had adequate evidence to 
show that they could do that, they could include it with the related advertising proposals 
in their applications for new product orders, and FDA would issue a corresponding 
permissive order. This readily available pathway to avoiding having to comply with all 
the advertising restrictions proposed here underscores why it would be extremely difficult 
for any court to find the proposed restrictions unconstitutional when established through 
final FDA new product orders. The agency would require the restrictions in a final 
order only if the applicant had failed to provide evidence that allowing its e-cigarettes 
on the market with less restrictive or less extensive advertising restrictions would still 
be at least as “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” But if the applicant 
had failed to show that any such less extensive means existed during the application 
and order process, it is unlikely that the applicant could establish, during a later lawsuit 
claiming First Amendment violations, that FDA should have employed less restrictive 
or less extensive advertising restrictions when it issued the order.   
It is not clear whether an applicant could at some point provide evidence in its new 
product application to justify some less-restrictive approach to advertising that could 
allow the e-cigarettes onto the market as “appropriate for the protection for the public 
health.” But to make the courts more comfortable with any advertising restrictions 
imposed by FDA in new product orders, the agency could include provisions in the 
orders stating that applicants receiving an order with advertising restrictions could 
subsequently apply to have those restrictions modified or eliminated by submitting new 
evidence showing that they are no longer appropriate for the protection of the public 
health or are more extensive than necessary, either in general or in regard to specific 
advertising proposed by the applicants.120
FDA could further establish that the advertising restrictions were “no more extensive 
than necessary” by showing the impracticality of permitting manufacturers or other 
sellers of e-cigarettes to use the more public forms of advertising more freely. Because 
of the well-established and court-recognized power of advertising,121 the only way the 
agency could possibly do that, without creating high risks of increasing initiation among 
youth and other public health harms would be either to: (a) establish strict time, place 
and manner and/or content restrictions on those publicly accessible ads; or (b) review 
120 Tobacco Control Act § 910(c)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C § 387j(c)(1)(B) (2012). This statute authorizes FDA 
to impose advertising restrictions in new product orders, so long as they are appropriate for the protection 
of the public health, which implicitly provides authority to modify or eliminate those restrictions whenever 
that is appropriate for the protection of the public health. See also Tobacco Control Act §§ 910(d), 911(i), 
911(j), 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j(d), 387k(i), 387k(j) (2012) (providing FDA with authority to review and withdraw 
or suspend new product and modified risk tobacco product orders, respectively.) To eliminate any possible 
ambiguity, and provide extra protections against claims that including the advertising restrictions in new 
product orders is “more extensive than necessary,” the agency could state in the orders that it would modify 
those restrictions to be less extensive whenever those receiving the orders submit evidence showing that the 
modifications would be appropriate for the protection of the public health, and the agency could also establish 
related procedures for the submission of that evidence and its review. 
121 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 560–61 (2001); Henricksen, supra note 29; 
Tobacco Act Findings (15)–(23), supra note 29; Press Release from Senators, supra note 30, at 9, 16; Duke 
et al., supra note 30; Pokhrel et al., supra note 31; surgeon general report 2012, supra note 31. 
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and test all such ads before they were used to ensure that they would not increase 
initiation among youth or produce any public health harms. However, because most 
other countries with active tobacco control strategies simply ban all tobacco product 
advertising, there is not much research on whether it is possible to regulate permitted 
tobacco product advertising to reduce undesirable public health impacts as effectively 
as through minimizing exposure, or on how that might be done. But history has shown 
that the tobacco industry is remarkably adept at adjusting to advertising regulations or 
bans to dampen or eliminate their beneficial impact;122 and the continual development 
of increasingly sophisticated and subtle advertising strategies and new advertising 
technologies make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for research or regulators 
to keep up. Consequently, it would likely be beyond FDA’s expertise or capacity to 
design less-extensive restrictions on the time, place and manner or content of e-cigarette 
advertising restrictions that had any likelihood of working as effectively to promote its 
substantial public health interests as the proposed advertising restrictions directed at 
minimizing exposure among certain populations. 
For many of the same reasons, as well as capacity issues, it would be even more 
difficult for FDA to review all e-cigarette ads before they were used to evaluate the 
likelihood that they would, alone or in coordination with other ads or marketing 
practices, produce negative public health outcomes that contradicted the agency’s 
purposes for allowing the e-cigarettes on the market or otherwise made the marketing 
of the e-cigarettes inappropriate for the protection of the public health. It is unlikely 
that FDA has or could be provided with sufficient resources to review every new or 
different e-cigarette ad before it was released without creating enormous backlogs and 
delay. Doing so effectively would be even more complex and expensive, requiring 
extensive testing of each ad, both on its own and in conjunction with other ads and 
marketing, and with different focus groups of different types of youth and adult non-
smokers and smokers. 
In many cases, the only way FDA would know with any confidence whether a certain 
ad, on its own or in a series, would not increase initiation or other undesirable public 
health outcomes would be if the ad were put into public circulation and FDA carefully 
monitored and analyzed its impacts. Such real-world testing of e-cigarette advertising 
would, however, mean that any increased initiation or other public health harms 
caused by the advertising could be addressed by the agency only after the harms had 
already occurred. But allowing such likely health harms to occur before taking action 
to prevent them cannot be considered appropriate for the public health. More to the 
point, a regulatory approach that allows e-cigarette advertising to increase public health 
harms, and that will restrict that advertising more severely only after it causes serious 
public health harms, should not be considered a viable “less extensive” restriction on 
commercial speech than the proposed advertising restrictions, which would do more 
to prevent the public health harms from occurring in the first place. Measures that are 
122 See, e.g., Constantine I. Vardavas et al., Changes in Tobacco Industry Advertising Around High 
Schools in Greece Following an Outdoor Advertising Ban: A Follow-up Study, 22 tobaCCo Control 299, 
299–301 (2013); Ross MacKenzie et al., Thailand—Lighting up a Dark Market: British American Tobacco, 
Sports Sponsorship and the Circumvention of Legislation, 61 J. of epidemiology & Cmty. HealtH 28, 28–33 
(2007); Mary Assunta & S. Chapman, The World’s Most Hostile Environment: How the Tobacco Industry 
Circumvented Singapore’s Advertising Ban, 13 tobaCCo Control ii57, ii51–57 (2004); Stacy M. Carter, 
Going Below the Line: Creating Transportable Brands for Australia’s Dark Market, 12 tobaCCo Control 
iii87, iii87–94 (2003).
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less effective at achieving the government’s substantial interests, even if they restrict 
speech less, cannot be “less extensive alternatives” for First Amendment purposes.123
These points, added to the prior analysis, suggest that placing the proposed advertising 
restrictions in new product orders would satisfy all aspects of the Central Hudson test. 
But the required supplementary messaging in the e-cigarette advertising would still need 
to be structured to fit within the First Amendment constraints on compelled commercial 
speech.124 That should not be difficult. First, as described above, the required messaging 
would be directed exclusively at advancing the government’s substantial interests (rather 
than only “reasonably related” as the courts have required).125 In addition, the messaging 
could also be designed to be purely informational, non-controversial, and identified 
as coming from the government (and not the sellers).126 To be even more certain the 
supplementary messaging would pass constitutional scrutiny, any graphic images could 
be avoided or, if included could be purely informational and not designed to evoke an 
emotional response.127 To make the required messaging even more defensible, their 
size and format could be structured to ensure that the messaging would be noticed by 
the consumers receiving the e-cigarette advertising but not be unduly expensive or 
burdensome for the sellers to include. 
VI. why not ISSUe A new e-cIGArette rULe, InSteAD? 
The forgoing analysis suggests that the advertising restrictions imposed by FDA 
through new product orders should pass constitutional muster, so long as the agency 
also follows all the procedures required by law, and is not “arbitrary and capricious” 
in determining that the restrictions are necessary to enable the agency to issue an order 
allowing the e-cigarettes on the market as “appropriate for the protection of the public 
health.”128 
If FDA decided, however, to implement this regulatory scheme solely through 
issuing a rule, the agency would not enjoy the previously described protections against 
First Amendment challenges that would be secured through establishing e-cigarette 
advertising restrictions only through enforcement discretion (where the products are 
illegal and have weaker, if any, First Amendment protections) and through new product 
and modified risk tobacco product orders (when constitutional rights may be waived 
and the applicants have the burden of presenting evidence that allowing their products 
on the market with fewer advertising constraints is “appropriate for the protection of the 
public health”). Notice-and-comment rulemaking would also probably take five years 
123 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); see also supra note 113 and accompanying 
text.
124 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
125 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 628, 651. 
126 For example, if including the 1-800-QUIT-NOW phone number or other cessation assistance 
information were thought to be “ideological and not informational,” “not warnings but admonitions,” or 
“unabashed attempts to . . . browbeat consumers into quitting,” and, therefore, were thought to go beyond 
the scope of permissible compelled speech, those aspects of the supplementary messaging could be omitted 
or revised. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211, 1216–17. 
127 Id. 
128 The “arbitrary and capricious” standard for such agency action is established in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012), and Section 912 of the Tobacco Control Act applies it to any judicial 
review of FDA tobacco product regulations or orders, Tobacco Control Act § 912(b), 21 U.S.C. § 387(l)(b) 
(2012).
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or more, while the process outlined above could be initiated soon after the deeming 
rule effective date. 
The disadvantages from using a rulemaking to establish the advertising restrictions 
would be most severe if FDA had, before issuing the final rule, already issued orders 
permitting e-cigarettes to be on the market as legal tobacco products without those 
restrictions. To issue such orders, FDA would have to find that it is “appropriate for 
the protection of the public health” to allow the e-cigarettes on the market without the 
advertising restrictions; and that would make it much more difficult to establish that the 
advertising restrictions in the new rule were “appropriate for the protection of the public 
health.” The agency could try to show that it was, first, “appropriate for the protection 
of the public health” to allow the e-cigarettes on the market without the advertising 
restrictions, and, second, even more “appropriate for the protection of the public health” 
to subject them subsequently to additional advertising restrictions through the rule. But 
FDA would still be in a much weaker position because the agency could no longer argue 
that the advertising restrictions were necessary to make having the e-cigarettes on the 
market be” appropriate for the protection of the public health,” which provides a much 
stronger foundation for defending the restrictions against First Amendment challenges. 
Most of these rulemaking challenges could be avoided if FDA could initiate and 
complete the rulemaking to establish the proposed e-cigarette product-safety and 
advertising restrictions during its implementation of the enforcement discretion stage 
proposed here and, especially, prior to issuing any orders allowing any e-cigarettes on 
the market without any advertising restrictions. But that might be difficult, given the 
time it takes to issue a final rule and the requirement in the Tobacco Control Act that 
FDA issue new product orders within 180 days of receiving a complete application from 
the manufacturer. It is possible, however, that FDA could issue only negative orders 
prior to the effective date of the new rule, finding that it would not be appropriate for 
the protection of the public health to allow any e-cigarettes on the market until the 
rule was in effect. Making that same point, FDA could, alternatively, issue permissive 
orders that would not go into effect until after the final rule establishing the advertising 
restrictions was in place.  
But even if done in these ways, issuing a rule to establish the proposed advertising 
restrictions would still be more difficult to defend against First Amendment attacks 
than advertising restrictions imposed through new product orders, and would still 
take considerably longer to implement. In either case, implementing the enforcement 
discretion stage, as described here, would sharply reduce e-cigarette-related health harms 
while the orders and/or rule were being developed and implemented. 
VII. concLUSIon
This paper has tried, first, to refocus the existing debate and discussion about 
e-cigarettes on figuring out what can be done now, without waiting for more research 
or data, to minimize e-cigarette harms while allowing them to realize their public health 
potential. Toward that end, it has presented the following core facts about e-cigarettes 
and their advertising that are already known, stated cautiously to seek general consensus: 
(1) e-cigarette use is addictive and is, to at least some not insignificant extent, more 
harmful and risky than no nicotine or tobacco use at all; (2) e-cigarette use is, to at least 
some significant extent, less harmful to users and nonusers than smoking, and could 
be made even less harmful; and (3) e-cigarette advertising, if not constrained, is likely 
to increase youth and non-smoker addiction and use and could increase non-beneficial 
dual use by smokers. 
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Those core facts support a regulatory scheme that allows e-cigarettes on the market 
only to serve as effective cessation aids or to offer smokers who would not otherwise 
quit with a less harmful way to consumer nicotine, while also preventing any offsetting 
harms through increased initiation, reduced cessation, or harmful dual use. Given existing 
practical and legal constraints, that cannot be done perfectly. But the approach proposed 
here provides a way to regulate e-cigarettes that would work to minimize the public 
health risks from e-cigarettes while still allowing them to pursue their public health 
potential. It offers a way to allow for meaningful public health gains without any serious 
downside risk of new health harms that could offset or overwhelm the those benefits. In 
other words, this paper suggests a way to begin regulating e-cigarettes immediately that 
would be appropriate for the protection and promotion of the public health, and might 
be the most effective approach available (especially if complemented with new efforts 
to make cigarettes and other similarly smoked products less attractive, less satisfying, 
or less readily available to smokers).
As an initial proposal for regulating e-cigarettes and their advertising, the basic 
framework suggested here could certainly benefit from additional scrutiny and analysis. 
As it stands, however, it hopes to provide some assistance to anyone, in any country, 
trying to determine how e-cigarettes might be regulated effectively to serve as a helpful 
weapon against smoking, the largest tobacco-related public health problem throughout 
the world. 
More specific to the United States, this paper has then gone further to suggest how 
FDA might use its existing drug and tobacco product authorities to implement this 
type of approach to e-cigarettes to protect and promote the public health—taking full 
advantage of existing procedures and statutory deadlines in the Tobacco Control Act 
to facilitate compliance with the First Amendment and to produce related health gains 
quickly. Here, too, additional scrutiny and analysis is needed and welcome.
Whether implemented in the United States or elsewhere, modifications to the 
details of the proposed approach could make it more or less demanding on e-cigarette 
manufacturers, importers and sellers. That would marginally alter the size and timing 
of the related public health benefits in one direction or another. But the hope here is that 
any quibbling over those or other details will not obscure or delay the development of 
a new consensus among both e-cigarette “hawks” and “doves” about how to proceed 
now to regulate e-cigarettes most effectively for the public health. 
If history is any guide, industry opposition to any significant new e-cigarette 
regulations will likely be severe. But the approach proposed here could provide 
e-cigarette companies with a reasonable transition period, require only the most 
common-sense product changes that some e-cigarette companies have already made or 
endorsed, and, despite the new advertising restrictions, still leave them able to compete 
effectively for their appropriate consumers, including an expedited pathway toward 
making modified risk claims to smokers.
Whether this approach might fit within FDA’s current regulatory priorities for tobacco 
products and its related enforcement priorities and capacity is for the agency to decide. 
This approach focuses the regulation of e-cigarettes specifically on reducing smoking—
which should be the top priority of any tobacco control efforts seeking to maximize 
public health gains. But there might be other, more effective strategies available to FDA 
to reduce smoking and its harms more quickly and sharply. Nevertheless, FDA will 
have to do something in regard to exercising enforcement discretion as soon as the final 
deeming rule makes all e-cigarettes illegal products, and the agency will at some point 
thereafter have to decide what orders to issue in response to e-cigarette applications 
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for new product and, possibly, modified risk tobacco product orders.  With luck, this 
paper will generate further discussion and analysis to help inform the agency’s actions 
and decisions in those areas. 
It may also be worth noting that the analysis here regarding how FDA could exercise 
its enforcement discretion in regard to e-cigarettes made illegal by the final deeming rule, 
and how it could handle related new product applications, could be applied similarly to 
other newly deemed products that become illegal tobacco products. 
